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ON THE COVER: MAG (Mines Advisory Group), photojournalist
Sean Sutton captured the devastation in Ukraine during his visit in
April 2022. See page six for his extended photo essay from the trip.
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A message from the interim director

S

ince our last publication, we at CISR have had the opportunity to meet with our colleagues again, attending the Mine Action Symposium in Croatia, Explosive Ordnance Seminar in Montenegro, and the APMBC
Intersessional, National Directors Meeting, and the MSP for the CCM, all held in Geneva, amongst other
domestic and international conferences. It has been wonderful to reconnect with our colleagues, discussing programs and planning ahead for the many hurdles presently facing the mine action community.
In this issue of The Journal, you will find a number of articles focused on Ukraine, including Sean Sutton’s poignant photo essay reflecting on the people he met and the devastation he encountered while working in the country
in April 2022. Additional topics discussed include capacity building in Syria; historical perspectives on mine action; the use of opensource research to identify explosive hazards in conflict areas; gender and diversity initiatives in mine action; and the corresponding
relationship between mine action, the environment, and sustainable agricultural development.
•

•

•

Use of Open-Source Information:
» Hampton Stall, Evan Leendertse, Han Prasad, Chris
McNabe, Rana Shabb (The Carter Center), Jennifer
Hudson (University of Central Florida), and Jonathan
Robinson (Brown University Center for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Studies) discuss their new opensource weighted estimate approach to capture unexploded ordnance (UXO) concentration in Syria.
» Andro Mathewson from The HALO Trust describes
how they have harnessed open-source research to better plan for and conduct survey, clearance operations,
and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) across
Ukraine.
Environment and the Triple Nexus:
» Katarina Balić (Swiss Foundation for Mine Action)
discusses the link between mine action and sustainable
development goals through their “Clear then Grow”
program linking mine action and agricultural recovery
in Northeast Syria.
» Linsey Cottrell, Eoghan Darbyshire (Conflict and
Environment Observatory), and Kristin Holme
Obrestad (Norwegian People’s Aid) warn readers of the
heavy environmental toll explosive weapons are taking
on civilian and industrial infrastructure in Ukraine.
Historical Perspectives of Mine Action:
» Professor of Political Science at James Madison
University, Ken Rutherford, presents his findings
on remaining UXO and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) contamination resulting from fighting between
Japanese and Allied forces in the Aleutian Islands during World War II.

Roly Evans from the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provides a historical
perspective on the contribution of mine detection dogs
over the past eight decades by looking at where they add
significatvalue while also understanding their limitations.
Digital EORE: Robin Taol (MAG, Mines Advisory Group)
discusses how the COVID-19 pandemic and recent conflicts
have required organizations to adapt their EORE to a digital
means of delivery to access hard-to-reach individuals and
communities affected by explosive ordnance.
Gender and Diversity in Mine Action: Raphaela
Lark, David Hewitson (Fenix Insight Ltd), and Domonic
Wolsey (GICHD) present results from their study of
gender and operational efficiency in field-based mine
action roles, addressing the stereotypes and assumptions
that may still exist regarding women’s performance and
availability to work.
Free From Explosives (FFE): In his article about making
explosive items FFE/INERT for training and demonstration
purposes, Roly Evans (GICHD) discusses the issues encountered when assessing or making items FFE, and argues
that there needs to be consistent procedures and processes
employed by the mine action sector when making explosive
items FFE.
Physical Security and Stockpile Management:
Lee Moroney (Golden West Humanitarian Foundation)
and Mark Veneris (US European Command) discuss the
evolution of physical security and stockpile management,
analyzing how methods have changed from “first-aid fixes”
to more holistic, capacity-building approaches.
»

•

•

•

•

We sincerely appreciate our contributors’ time in writing and willingness to share their research and program work, as well as the successes and challenges they have encountered in their operations over the past year. As we look ahead to our 27th edition of The Journal,
we encourage the community to continue to share their reflections, experiences, and lessons learned—perhaps even more important than
ever as the sector looks toward conducting operations in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, and Syria. With this in mind, please review our
new calls for papers, highlighting the interconnectivity of the mine action sector and evolving global events, environmental concerns,
and reflection of societal changes through diversity and inclusion initiatives.
Sincerely,

Suzanne Fiederlein, PhD
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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Through the eyes of the people
By Sean Sutton [ Mines Advisory Group ]

I

have seen first-hand the longlasting destruction that can
be caused by explosive weap-

ons and landmines across the
world. My trip to Ukraine in April
2022 was no different. Ukraine
has been ravaged by conflict for
more than eight months. During
my time there, I found many
examples

of

makeshift

signs

warning returning civilians that
strategically planted explosive
weapons were somewhere inside
or nearby. Written in bold, the
signs serve as a warning for all
types of unexploded ordnance
(UXO) such as bombs, booby
traps, and landmines.
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Entrance to the fields blocked by a
landmine warning sign. Anti-vehicle
mines were suspected in the area.
All images courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
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LVIV

People arrived at Lviv railway station after a long night of traveling from Zaporizhzhia.
Lena fled with her family from Orikhiv, which is southeast of Zaporizhzhia, close to the
front line. “The town has been mostly destroyed with bombs landing every day. The
explosions bow in the windows and the doors. We have small children, and we couldn’t
cope. The children couldn’t sleep, and we were all terrified. We are all so stressed.”
A train transporting civilians from Lviv was damaged by Russian rockets soon after leaving Zaporizhzhia.
Serhi, the train manager, explained:
It was the most difficult day in my career. We left at twelve mid-day and just arrived here at 3:30
p.m. the next day—more than twenty-seven hours later. Soon after we left, as we were crossing the
bridge to Khortytsia island, two missiles exploded. The blast took out many windows and did a lot
of damage, but because we always have the blinds down, no one was injured. It was a miracle. Four
of the carriages had to be changed at the next station.
8
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As people arrived by train to Lviv from the areas under attack,
such as Mariupol, volunteers were at hand to assist.

Vera fled with her husband, Evan, and their three children.
They came from Molochansk, near Zaporizhzhia.

We left in an organized convoy. There were burning tanks and bodies on the street. Unexploded
bombs were lying around. There are landmines in the fields. It was terrible. We had to go through
ten checkpoints. Our car broke down, so we were separated from the convoy. My husband was
repeatedly strip searched. We had to go because soldiers were going house-to-house to check
people. They killed anyone with links to the military. Because my husband was a soldier before, we
had to flee. We are lucky to have managed to escape.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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ANDRIIVKA

Surviving villagers from Andriivka sit among the remains of their homes.
Surviving villagers from Andriivka sit amongst the remains of their homes.
10

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Viktor walks past unexploded
projectiles in the remains of
his village, Andriivka.

The village of Andriivka was occupied by Russian forces for thirty-five days. The main
road linking Borodyanka to Makariv runs through it. Tanks were positioned between the
houses on one side and Grad rocket launchers were stationed between the houses on the
other side. Grigory, one of the villagers, described his experience:
Different groups of Russians stayed here. Some were okay, others were not. Some
people managed to leave before they came here. Forty of us survived—we are all
over fifty. People were killed by the Russians in the village or the shelling—we have
lost fifty-three people that we know of. They came with nothing—no food and little
ammunition. They didn’t know that they were coming here to fight. They thought they
were just coming on an exercise. A few days before they left, they started packing
everything from the village—they took everything. The soldiers took ten 6x6 Ural
trucks to a field nearby and unloaded all their grad rockets. They blew them up in a big
explosion and then filled them with washing machines and everything else.

Russian soldiers had a Grad multi-barrel rocket launcher positioned near Viktor’s house
(image above). It was damaged by Ukrainian shelling. The Russians were trying to fix it when
they were ordered to retreat from the area. They warned the villagers to keep away from the area
early in the morning of 30 March 2022, and then blew the launcher up to stop it falling into
Ukrainian hands.

ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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MAG technical operations manager with Kornet anti-tank missiles. They have been
partially burnt but still contain their explosive warheads.

MAG technical operations manager
warns villages not to touch the
explosive remains of a Grad rocket.
12
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Mycola next to a mattress with the
word “human” written on it and
attached to the cellar door. He
explained: “This is where I spent
my time for thirty-five days. There
was always shelling. One hit my
cow shed and killed my cows.”

There were five rockets still in the launcher when they blew it up,” explained Viktor, “The explosion
destroyed five houses. How could they do that? There was no reason. They said that it was the
Ukrainian Army’s fault for damaging it, so the villages should suffer. My mother was injured and is still
in hospital with leg injuries. I spent ten years building my house and I am a pensioner with nothing.
What can I do? The authorities say there will be no compensation until after the war.

The village has suffered a lot during the conflict.
There were tanks placed between the houses and they fired all the time ... they killed our animals
and took our food ... they have planted landmines near here. Deminers cleared landmines from the
area and told people it was safe. But after they let the cows [out] two of them died. It wasn’t safe at
all. They didn’t find all of them [landmines] obviously.

ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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OZERA
VILLAGE

Raisa and Sergiy escaped the village with their
son and dog on 25 February 2022.

ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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A destroyed car and a child's toy in Hostomel.
Ozera village was on the front line close to Hostomel and its strategically important airfield. Taking the base
was a key priority for the Russians and the airborne assault was one of the first major operations undertaken.
The assault failed. Ozera changed sides several times resulting in the destruction of much of the village.
Raisa and Sergiy escaped with their son and dog from the village on 25 February 2022, and said that they
were extremely lucky, twice:
We made a quick decision and put what we could into the car and fled. It was very frightening, there was fighting and bombing everywhere. We almost ran out of petrol. The car
stopped just next to the first petrol station we came to.
The quick decision they made probably saved their lives. Sergiy’s sister’s family tried to escape later. Her
husband was shot and died and then the car was hit by a rocket and their mother and father were killed.
Their family went back to the village to find that their house had been further demolished. The remains
of a Ukrainian army truck had been there before, along with lots of explosive ordnance (EO) spread out
from the explosion. The truck had been full of ammunition. The army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
team placed all the shells in their basement and then blew them up. The explosion has left a huge hole in the
ground.
Before, the house was destroyed but the foundations and basement were salvageable.
Now there is nothing.
16
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Abandoned Russian positions
and minefields (right) in Hostomel.

Tanya, a villager, lost her house in the explosion.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022

17

PEREMOHA
VILLAGE
Peremoha village is situated east of Kyiv and is positioned close to a small river. The village was named
Peremoha, which means victory in English, because of the military successes here in World War II. The
same thing—victory—happened again explained Viktor, who remained in his village throughout the time of
Russian occupation.
I watched everything. They came with great force three times to try and cross the
river. But they were repelled by the Ukrainian heroes three times. The last battle was
on 9 March. Many tanks and BMPs [a Russian infantry fighting vehicle] were destroyed.
There were Russian bodies everywhere and pieces of bloody clothing. One young soldier called Zhenya, or Khak for short, is now a hero. He destroyed four tanks, three with
Javelin missiles and one with a Kornet missile. When the tanks exploded parts fell all
over the village—everywhere, boom, boom, boom. I used to hide in the grass and watch.
18
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"The Russians put many
mines in the village,
even in the cemetery.
Several deminers died
here. One hit a mine in
his jeep, then the next
day another died.
It was terrible.”
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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IRPIN

20
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Graves being prepared in Irpin.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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Storefront in Irpin with the word “mine” written on a damaged door.

MAG technical operations manager points out dangerous items to soldiers manning
a checkpoint. They said that people come with suspicious things. They report
dangerous items to the army EOD teams but some items that were thought to just be
scrap pieces in fact either contained explosives and or fuzes and were dangerous.
22
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We were worried about
the cats; we didn’t know if
they survived but thankfully
they did. We fled when the
building next to us was hit,
killing many people. All our
windows were blown out and
we fled in terror. Bodies and
flames everywhere. Our flats
are damaged but okay, but
in a neighbor's flat there is
something suspicious.

Lindila and Tatiana came back to their flats in
Irpin to check on their homes and their cats.

Through the crack of a blastdamaged door a hand grenade can
clearly be seen. It has been placed
on top of a large water dispenser.
It could be a booby trap. Perhaps
the water container has something
other than water in it. Authorities
were informed of the hand grenade. Booby traps have been
widely reported in areas previously
controlled by Russian forces.

Possible booby trap.

A children's playground hit with cluster munitions. The unmistakable marks
including fragmentation "splatter" can be seen all around the area.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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BODORYANKA
and

KYIV OBLAST

Destruction of
Bodoryanka,
in Kyiv Oblast.
Many bodies
were taken
out of the
rubble.

24
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Large areas of Bodoryanka were destroyed
during intense and sustained bombardments.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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Sandbags protect entrances, and sandbagged positions, barricades, and hedgehog
anti-tank obstacles are set up in many parts of Kyiv.

We have a big job on
our hands. There is such a
huge problem with explosives, and we are very
busy. Some areas like
Hostomel have a lot of
landmines and we are finding a lot of boobytraps. In
Bucha, bodies were booby
trapped with hand grenades placed under their
armpits. In two months,
my team has dealt with
more than twelve tons of
ordnance in three villages.
.
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There are rings of defenses inside and outside the city.

An army EOD team dealt with rockets and rocket
pods from a downed Russian MI-8 helicopter.
Four bodies were sprawled among the wreckage.
The helicopter was shot down near Makariv by
Ukrainian forces on 17 March 2022.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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NEXT STEPS

Most of the people I met in Ukraine were older people
who stayed at home in their towns and villages as fighting raged around them. They were the ones who had survived the occupation and they were deeply traumatized.
ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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Rebuilding after the conflict.

Just days after the Russian troops had been pushed out, villages were
being cleared by groups of volunteers traveling amidst the devastation. It
is this resilience that stood out to me. This is but a brief snapshot of what
I saw and offers only a glimpse of the enormity of the work that the mine
action sector will face in the years to come.

32
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Galina outside her flat.
The other side of the building
is completely destroyed.

We are survivors. Five of us stayed here during everything. It was terrible. Many died. Our building was repeatedly hit. Now we survive on the
little food we have. There is no electricity, no water. We cook outside and
collect river water. That’s how we survive. Before we were neighbors, but
now we are family.

Sean Sutton

Photojournalist and International Communications Manager
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
Instagram: @Seansuttonphoto
https://www.maginternational.org/

Sean Sutton is an award-winning photojournalist; his well-known pictures show the impact of landmines and
explosive remnants of war on communities and have been published and exhibited all over the world. His book
documenting how unexploded ordnance affects people in Laos was runner-up for the Leica European Publisher’s
Award. Sutton is MAG’s International Communications Manager and has worked for the organization since 1997.

ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022
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Mine sign, Ukraine, June 2022.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.

OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH AND MAPPING OF

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
CONTAMINATION IN UKRAINE
By Andro Mathewson [ The HALO Trust ]

D

ue to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the scale of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination
in Ukraine has reached unprecedented levels, necessitating new methods to assess and track
the different types of ordnance and the level of contamination across the country. As the most
documented, active war on social media to date, The HALO Trust (HALO) has successfully harnessed
open-source research to better plan and conduct survey, clearance operations, and explosive ordnance
risk education (EORE) across the country.
Russian’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February
2022, has become “the first open-source war,” where almost every
aspect of the conflict on the ground has an online counterpart—
from logistics and guidance systems to humanitarian aid delivery
and conflict mapping.1 As the transport of supplies occurs on the
ground, the plans thereof are drafted online. As the soldiers adjust
the guidance systems of their weaponry on the frontlines, engineers online are solving issues that arise. As humanitarian aid is
being delivered across Ukraine, teams of analysts are crunching
data to prioritize the regions with the highest need. As the conflict
progresses and frontlines move, researchers are mapping the conflict and its devastating effects on Ukraine, including the EO that is
left behind in areas where the fighting has subsided.
The scale of EO contamination in Ukraine has reached
unprecedented levels, necessitating new methods to assess and
track the different types of EO and the level of EO contamination
across Europe’s largest country due to its inaccessibility to organizations working in-country as a result of the ongoing conf lict.
Harnessing open-source research, satellite imagery, and online

34
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TM-62M, first landmine found from latest war
in Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

investigations, HALO is leading this effort and has been able to
assess and map EO contamination across Ukraine for humanitarian end-purposes, allowing HALO staff working in Ukraine
to better plan and conduct survey and clearance operations as
well as EORE across the country.
HALO has been working in Ukraine since the end of 2015 in
the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Over seven years, HALO teams conducted non-technical survey
(NTS), clearance, and risk education throughout the region, particularly along the contact line that existed until February 2022.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in February temporarily brought survey and clearance work to a halt, while staff focused on moving
their families to safety in the west of the country and assisted with
aid distribution, risk education, and first aid training. The Russian

withdrawal from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts by early April
2022 provided a window for operations to resume safely and
HALO relocated its operations to a base just outside Kyiv to be
able to work in these three regions. Despite the uncertainty during the initial stages of the war before the partial Russian withdrawal, HALO wanted to be fully prepared for future operations
and began using a “remote” approach to understand the type
of EO used and the scale and impact of contamination within
Ukraine. This article explains the path HALO has taken to track
EO and explosive remnants of war (ERW) across Ukraine online
using open-source research and mapping techniques. Such wellstructured open-source research based on social media is becoming an increasingly important part of the desk assessment phase
and contextual information required for NTS.2

The Context in Ukraine
By mid-July, Russia occupied approximately 126,610
square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, 3 almost
twenty-one percent of the entire country, including
areas in the east, south, and the Crimean Peninsula.
Since the full-scale invasion started on 24 February
2022, the conflict has seen more than an estimated
100,000 deaths of soldiers on both sides, foreign volunteers, and civilians.4 During the initial stages of the war
in February and March 2022, Russian troops moved
swiftly across northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine,
encircling cities such as Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol.
By April, Russian forces had retreated or been pushed
back from most newly occupied areas, except along
Ukraine’s southern coast reaching Kherson in the west
and large parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and
Zaporizhia Oblasts, creating a frontline of approximately 2,000 kilometers long.
As with all conflicts that involve conventional military technologies and tactics, such as the use of heavy
artillery and anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines
for area denial, the war in Ukraine has led to vast
amounts of EO contamination across the country, leaving civilians directly at risk. However, the situation is
worsened by the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions and the presence of kicked-out munitions from
destroyed military vehicles and ammunition depots,
which also pose a threat to civilian bystanders. Understanding these different threats to civilians and the
location of EO contamination is critical to effective and
efficient humanitarian demining operations.
Figure 1. Assessed control of terrain in
Ukraine as of 20 July 2022, 3:00 p.m. ET. ©
2022. Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and
American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats
Project made possible by the Dr. Jack London
Geospatial Fund at ISW.
Figure courtesy of ISW.
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MRV-U impact fuzes for
grad system.
Image courtesy of HALO.

9N255 cluster submunition in Ukraine, June 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

Defining Open-Source Research
Open-source research is the process of collecting and analyzing
legally gathered information from publicly available sources only,
without the use of clandestine collection techniques and containing no information from private or classified sources. Open-source
research can be conducted in a variety of ways depending on the
scenario, information desired, and availability. In simple terms,

Risk education, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.
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it revolves around the collection of information, predominantly
online but also via verbal or written communication, with the
end goal of analyzing the collected data to extrapolate an analysis.
Depending on the situation, the analysis can be used to inform the
public about an important topic, advise public and national policies, or inspire a call to action.
While open-source research is frequently used in national
security and law enforcement, with the expansion of the internet,
smartphones, and social media, it has become an accessible tool
used by non-governmental organizations and individuals alike.5
Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the conflict in
eastern Ukraine in 2014, open-source research has also become a
constant of modern warfare, helping to thin out the fog of war.6
Many global organizations use open-source information, including the United Nations, to support peacekeeping operations and
plan the delivery of aid during times of crisis or disaster. The war
in Ukraine is by far the most active conflict on social media of all
time, consequently allowing HALO to leverage the high volume
of information using open-source research for the collection and
analysis of data on EO contamination in Ukraine. This in turn has
enabled HALO to better plan and conduct operations and carry
out EORE activities more efficiently and effectively. This includes
determining the priorities for the deployment of NTS and clearance teams, to informing the procurement of the most appropriate
equipment for the expected threat.

Lipivka minefield clearance, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

HALO’s Approach to Open-Source Research
HALO has previously used open-source research for a smallscale project in Tripoli, Libya, where researchers focused on
social media posts that were sharing photos and videos, indicating evidence of landmines and improved explosive devices. The
exact locations of contamination finds were then placed on a map
alongside the frontlines of the 2018 battle for Tripoli (see Figure
2). Plotting the locations of unexploded ordnance and battlefield
frontlines enabled HALO to prepare for NTS—the process of identifying and marking suspected and confirmed hazardous areas—
and prioritize areas with high levels of contamination and high
levels of human activity. Since March 2022, this approach has been
successfully applied to and expanded in the Ukraine context.
HALO’s current open-source research methodology includes
five central stages, as outlined in Table 1.

Historical Frontline in Greater Tripoli
Analysis of Different Dates

Tripoli

Tajoura
Hai Alandalus

Suq Aljumaa
Abusliem

Janzour
Ain Zara

Legend
Evidence of ERW
Landmines Identified
Landmine Accidents
June 20th (beginning of
Frontline Positioning)

December 31, 2019

Figure 2. Historical frontlines and ERW
locations in the greater Tripoli area.
Figure courtesy of HALO.

May 21, 2020 (Furthest
Advancement of LNA)

May 31, 2020 (LNA’s
final withdrawal)
Area of Potential Highest
Contamination

Adminstrative
Boundaries
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No. Research Stage

Ukraine Context

1.

Determining end goals and
focus of research

Map the EO contamination in Ukraine due to the Russian invasion, including the
location of civilian accidents due to ERW (see objectives in Table 2)

2.

Identify sources

Social media (Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook), traditional media (Ukrainian and
international news outlets), think tank reports, and research organizations (Live
Universal Awareness Map and Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED))

3.

Conduct searches online

Conduct deep-dive searches through online media for relevant events within set
objectives (see Table 2)

4

Verify/geolocate events

Use verification and geolocation techniques to ascertain the veracity of reports
and identify the precise location of events

5.

Mapping, collation, and analysis Extrapolate information from the data to inform HALO’s survey, planning,
of data
clearance operations, and EORE delivery

Table 1. HALO’s open-source research methodology.
Table courtesy of HALO.

The first of these stages, determining the end goals and the focus of research, resulted in the identification of thirteen objectives with
different purposes as outlined in Table 2.
Objectives/Categories

Purpose

Track the movement of frontlines

To locate areas with a high likelihood of EO contamination

Track areas of prolonged fighting

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of cluster munition
strikes

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of any EO

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of destroyed military
vehicles

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify locations of air and missile
strikes

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify all types of EO used in the
conflict

Tailor EORE campaign and materials for items found in the region; Tailor
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training ID guides; identify suitable
procedures and EOD tools; inform all HMA actors of what to expect in the
region; inform procurement of machines and detectors

Identify areas of landmine/improvised
exposive device contamination

Provides evidence point for future NTS teams to investigate; information can
be shared with other humanitarian actors enabling safer delivery of humanitarian aid

Identify any strikes on ammunition
storage facilities

Provides evidence points for future NTS teams to investigate

Identify vehicles and weapon systems
used in the conflict

Assists in defining what type of munitions could be used by these platforms,
which then helps with EO recognition

Identify the location of civilian
accidents and the number of
casualties from UXO

Monitor the number of civilian casualties due to UXO; report this figure to other
humanitarian actors; assist in planning or provision of victim assistance activities

Identify destroyed infrastructure

Critical information for wider humanitarian effort

Understand the causes of non-HMA
demining accidents reported in the
media

Provides evidence point for future NTS teams to investigate; assists in defining
potential hazards to deminers in HMA.

Table 2. Identified objectives.
Table courtesy of HALO.
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Tank rounds,
Ukraine, 2022.

Image courtesy of HALO.

The second step involves identifying publicly available sources
to procure information. The majority of HALO’s information
stems from social media platforms, primarily Twitter, Telegram,
and Facebook, but also Reddit and YouTube. HALO uses advanced
search techniques such as boolean logic searches to filter content
and find images and videos about the aforementioned categories.
Another large source of information is local Ukrainian news and
media outlets, such as Suspline Media, Unian, and RBC-Ukraine,
as well as official press releases of Ukrainian local police forces or
government officials. Finally, HALO also utilizes publicly available
pre-collated databases with pertinent information, such as those by
Live Universal Awareness Map, ACLED, the Center for Information
Resilience, and volunteer groups, such as Geoconfirmed.
The third step of HALO’s open-source research project is verifying the data that is discovered using the different sources previously mentioned. HALO follows a four-step verification process.
This begins with assessing the originality of the image or video in

question. If the image or the video was used before, it is frequently
possible to trace it back to the original online posting via a reverse
image and/or video search. There are a multitude of different tools
online that allow such searches and will show if an image has been
posted before the current post. This helps to minimize false claims
of EO items apparently found in Ukraine, which might actually
stem from other conflicts. After determining the originality of the
content, the reliability of the source is assessed on a scale of low,
medium, or high reliability. If the information stems from official
Ukrainian government sources, a well-recognized media outlet,
or social media account and can be corroborated by at least one
other source, it is classified as “highly reliable.” If it cannot be corroborated by other sources, it falls under the “medium reliability”
category. The previous two categories are added to HALO’s database and map, which is shared with other actors in the humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector. If it stems from a previously
unknown source and provides little detail, it is classified under
the “low reliability” category and not included in our public-facing
datasets until it can be verified. The third step in the verification
process is geolocating the image. Geolocation is the identification
of the geographic location of an object in an image via a variety
of data collection mechanisms, such as satellite imagery and GPS
metadata. However, HALO only uses satellite imagery and other
mapping tools to geolocate source material, as metadata is often
sensitive and has restricted access. The geolocation of an image
not only helps to ascertain the veracity of the content (e.g., does it
depict an event within Ukraine or is it from another conflict), but it
also facilitates HALO to create a detailed map depicting all events
Figure 3. HALO’s conflict and contamination map as of
26 September 2022. Each dot corresonds to a unique
event involving EO and the colors represent a different
category based on HALO’s project objectives.
Figure courtesy of HALO.
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discovered by open-source research, creating a portrait of the conflict in Ukraine, as shown in Figure 3.7
This enables HALO to plot areas with high EO contamination
(according to the previously mentioned objectives) and overlaps
them with areas of high human activity, such as densely populated areas or farmland. This subsequently allows HALO to prioritize different survey, clearance, and EORE tasks. The final step of
the verification process is assessing when the image or video was
posted online. If it was posted before the annexation of Crimea
and the occupation of the eastern reaches of Luhansk and Donetsk
Oblast in 2014, the content definitively does not portray (new) EO

in Ukraine.8 If an image is posted post–2014, it increases the likelihood that it accurately depicts ERW in Ukraine.
The last stage of the open-source research process is to collate
and analyze the data, which allows for the production of several
different outputs, all of which help to inform either HALO’s operations or HALO’s donors and other humanitarian organizations. At
the time of publication, HALO has gathered and verified 20,000
unique events, within the thirteen categories previously mentioned, showing the location of each event, including 196 accidents involving civilians (112 deceased and 257 injured).9 These are
depicted in Figure 4.

Ordnance Type
Figure 4. HALO’s dashboard showing data gathered onCasualties
civilianbyaccidents
due to UXO in Ukraine.

Figure courtesy of HALO.
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Figure 5. Casualties by activity (left);
casualties by EO type (right).
Figure courtesy of HALO.

Anti-tank mine strike,
LADA Nova, Ukraine, 2022.

Image courtesy of HALO.

HALO’s research has also identified 400 unique types of EO
used in the conflict, primarily Russian or Soviet-made munitions
but also many Western designs. HALO does not currently track
different types of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). However,
the tracking of SA/LW represents a potential area of expansion
for the project, especially to focus on Man Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS), which have been used extensively throughout the war. The knowledge accumulated through open-source
research has allowed HALO to understand the EO contamination of Ukraine in-depth and has aided in the planning of areas
of operations, prioritization of tasks, training of staff, equipment
purchases, and risk education activities.
An example of HALO’s open-source research leading to clearance operations is one of HALO’s tasks in the region east of Kyiv,
near the village of Hoholiv. On 5 April 2022, a tractor hit an
anti-vehicle mine, resulting in the injury of the driver. This was
reported in the local newspaper, the Brovary Tribune.10 The site
of this accident subsequently became one of HALO’s first clearance tasks after the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast earlier
that month, which allowed HALO to safely resume operations
in the region.

While incredibly valuable to HALO, open-source research does
come with its own set of unique challenges. One of the major challenges is the impossibility to collect all information on EO contamination across Ukraine. While the level of detail in reporting
of the conflict is immense (to the level that it creates the issue of
informational overload), there will be explosive events that remain
unreported due to the fog of war and the immensity of the scale of
Ukraine and the war itself. Additionally, the complete verification
and precise geolocation of data is sometimes impossible, either due
to the presence of misinformation or the lack of sufficient information associated with the imagery or in the image itself. Another
challenge is the size of resultant datasets, numbering in the tens of
thousands, which require cleaning while each data point requires
verification.
A final challenge faced by HALO in conducting open-source
research is the policies of many social media companies that
remove content due to its graphic nature before HALO can access
and archive it for verification and geolocation. Despite these issues,
however, HALO’s open-source research and mapping project has
shown promise in helping to understand the progression of the
conflict and its resultant effects on Ukraine.

300m 9M55 rocket, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.
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Anti-tank mine strike near
Hoholi, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of HALO.

Limitations of Open-Source Data
Both social media and news media tend to emphasize the new
and unusual. For example, there has been extensive coverage of the
use of the POM-3 scatterable mine and improvised munitions such
as drink cans with explosives dropped by altered commercial offthe-shelf drones. Yet, the frequency of news reports does not match
their prevalence on the ground, nor their impact on civilians.

Armoured personnel carrier strike near
highway and playground, Ukraine, 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.
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Casualty data from open-source reporting, followed by the work
of HALO’s NTS and clearance teams, so far demonstrates that
anti-vehicle mines—primarily the TM-62M variant—are causing
the majority of accidents with the highest number of casualties.
Clearing the land of anti-vehicle mines is subsequently where the
bulk of HMA resources will need to be committed.

Moving Forward and Wider Use
NTS team, Ukraine, June 2022.

Image courtesy of HALO.

Moving forward, HALO is looking to expand the scope of tools
used in this project to reduce the amount of manual labor needed for
the data processing aspects of the research. This potentially includes
leveraging artificial intelligence to assist with both internet scraping and data cleaning tasks although these tools must be designed to
work with original source data in Ukrainian and Russian to minimize the chance that any details are lost in translation.

As time progresses, HALO will begin to evaluate the effectiveness of the project, with a special focus on understanding its use for
targeted EORE activities and assessing what proportion of recorded
events have resulted in the subsequent creation of suspected hazardous areas or confirmed hazardous areas once followed up by
NTS teams on the ground. Importantly, the use of such opensource research techniques is easily transferable to other locations
and projects within the HMA sector and beyond, especially where
in-country access is restricted for whatever reason or there is a lack
of data regarding EO used in the conflict and the resultant contamination. The ability to conduct in-depth research online allows
organizations like HALO to have a detailed understanding of the
conflict even before stepping on the ground.
See endnotes page 105

HALO deminer, Kyiv Oblast, June 2022.
Image courtesy of HALO.

Andro Mathewson
Research Officer
The HALO Trust
Andro Mathewson is a Research Officer at The HALO Trust, leading HALO’s open-source research project of the conflict in Ukraine. He also serves as a Capability Support Officer working to develop to programs and R&D initiatives. Matthewson received his Master’s degree in International Relations from the
University of Edinburgh and Bachelor of Arts in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from the University of
Pennsylvania. You can reach him via Twitter at @andro_mathewson.
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EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS USE AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES:

Mapping Environmental Incidents
in Ukraine

A

By Linsey Cottrell, Eoghan Darbyshire, PhD [ Conflict and Environment Observatory ],
and Kristin Holme Obrestad [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

ll conflicts result in environmental impacts. The use of explosive weapons can
cause massive damage to civilian and industrial infrastructure, resulting in the
contamination of air, soil, and water resources. The war in Ukraine has highlighted
the heavy toll on the environment, and the risk of significant environmental harm.

Chernihiv, April 2022.

Image courtesy of Oleksandr Ratushniak / UNDP Ukraine (flickr).

Chernihiv, April 2022.

Image courtesy of Oleksandr Ratushniak / UNDP Ukraine (flickr).
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Ukraine has an extensive and diverse industrialized economy,
including heavy manufacturing and nuclear facilities. As well as
the environmental risks from existing contamination linked to
its industrial heritage, the targeting and damage to commercial,
industrial, and energy infrastructure has exacerbated these risks
for civilians and the wider environment. This means an increased
risk of exposure for people living within or near impacted areas, as
well as for humanitarian and mine action workers delivering support to these communities.

Monitoring Conflict Pollution
Conflict pollution describes the contamination caused by the
direct damage to infrastructure, by the use of particular weapons,
or from the absence or collapse of environmental governance during and after conflict.3
In conflict settings, collecting environmental data and monitoring the impacts of conflict pollution can be limited and extremely
challenging. Satellite remote sensing can be used to fill the gap
and a useful tool to monitor both short-term impacts and longterm environmental change.4 But remote sensing has limitations;
for example, the majority of satellite sensors rely on the sun’s rays,
and so cannot provide data when it is dark or cloudy. While radar
imaging can overcome these challenges, it only orbits above many
locations a few times each month, and so is of limited use for timesensitive research. To fully understand the environmental risks,
satellite data needs to be blended with more detailed information
from the ground.
A range of data sources are required to generate robust remote
assessments, which may include help to identify priority locations

Data is critical and it is important that environmental incidents
and their significance are mapped and monitored.1 This will help
provide an indication of the geographical spread of environmental damage, and prioritize remediation needs. It is also important
to communicate more widely the environmental consequences
of conflict, which are often ignored or considered a low priority.
This is despite the risk of environmental degradation undermining human health, livelihoods, and security, and despite the UN
General Assembly declaring that everyone has the right to a healthy
environment.2

for remediation. The scale of environmental data collection in
Ukraine is far beyond that of past and contemporary conf licts.
International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the Conf lict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), Zoï
Environment Network, IMPACT, and PAX, have been collating
data on environmental incidents to support agencies, and help
inform the authorities and other humanitarian actors on followup sampling, evaluation, and remediation needs. Zoï Environment Network has used information primarily from government
and traditional media sources to produce maps on its Ecodozor
platform (see Figure 1).
The CEOBS database incorporates detail to enable an assessment
of the environmental risk. The first step is to identify incidents. This
is achieved via a semi-automated search of social media, in particular Twitter and Telegram, plus traditional media reports, tip-offs,
or the use of pre-existing databases and monitoring networks. The
next step is to collect and archive as much information on the incident as possible. This requires both the aforementioned sources and

High resolution satellite image showing crater damage to
agricultural land in June 2022, Dovhenke, Kharviv Oblast.
Image courtesy of Maxmar Technologies/Twitter.
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Environmental risk due to
inﬂicted damage or disruptions

Based on data from https://ecodozor.org/
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Figure 1. Mapping of environmental risks from damage to industry and infrastructure, based on data
from https://ecodozor.org/
Image courtesy of Zoï Environment Network.

satellite data, such as before and after imagery5 or active fire data.6
By collecting and combining all this information, it is possible to
locate precisely where an incident occurred, verify that it occurred
and at the stated time, classify the incident type and severity of
damage, and finally, assess the environmental risk. Verification

is important given the potential for fake news, disinformation, or
politicization.7 The environmental risk is established via a simple
qualitative score-card which takes into account air, water, and
soil pollution, and proximity to dense populations or ecologically
important areas.

Nature of Environmental Incidents
The war in heavily industrialized Ukraine has seen attacks
on a wide range of industrial facilities and infrastructure. There
are thousands of entries in the Ecodozor database, and this only
includes those incidents for which there is reporting. The true
number is likely much higher.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate examples from the CEOBS database
that indicate the broad range of incidents taking place in Ukraine,
which can give rise to short- or long-term environmental concerns. Many incidents will have direct consequences on humanitarian mine action operations, which must be addressed under the
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standard operating procedures and risk assessments of organizations deploying humanitarian and mine action staff.
Within urban settings, there are multiple potential sources of
pollution and proportionately more people vulnerable to the risk of
exposure to contaminants. With commercial and industrial units,
utility infrastructure, filling stations, workshops, fuel storage, and
garages all located in urban areas, the use of explosive weapons
can result in contamination and the release of a host of toxic and
hazardous chemicals from damaged buildings and infrastructure.
This can create airborne contaminants and can contaminate water

resources and/or underlying soils,
negatively impacting human health
through direct contact, inhalation,
or ingestion of chemicals or contaminated soils. It can also create indirect
pathways to exposure, for instance
from leaching through soils, migrating to underlying groundwater, and
flowing into streams or rivers.
Although not unique to the conflict in Ukraine, the anticipated
widespread presence of asbestos
within building fabric and conflict
debris also presents a serious health
and environmental hazard. Ukraine
was a major producer of asbestos,
with high rates of asbestos use in
construction over many decades.
Records on the location, nature, and
distribution of asbestos-containing
materials in Ukraine, however are
unclear, meaning that response plans
must take into consideration the
likely presence of asbestos and take
action to reduce the risk of exposure
and harm.8
Other contaminants of potential
concern include metals like lead
and chromium, fuel oils, PCBs,9 fire
retardants, and explosives. Their
presence will vary depending on
location, urban setting, age, nature of
construction materials, and the type
of land uses. Some contaminants will
disperse and eventually degrade in
the environment, but many do not
and will persist for years.
There are also the risks associated
with the use of specific weaponry.
It is currently unclear if, or to what
extent, depleted uranium (DU)
ammunition has been used in the
fighting in Ukraine.10 DU is both
radioactive and chemically toxic.
If the use of DU is confirmed, key
potential exposure routes for people
include contact, and the inhalation
or ingestion of DU-contaminated
soil or particulates.11

Facility #1: Agricultural warehouse,
Dolgenkoe farm
Incident description: Fertilizer explosion
(ammonium nitrate)
Impact: Significant physical damage and chemical release (including nitrogen oxides to air).
No surface water in close proximity, but visible
impact on soils.
Preliminary risk screening: Medium (overall)
• Short-term – high risk: physical injury from
explosion, inhalation of toxic fumes and particulates
• Longer-term – medium risk: persistent
ground contamination from combustion
products, agrochemicals and fuels
Figure 2. Dovhenke, Kharkiv Oblast, May 2022.
Image courtesy of Pavlo Kyrylenko/Telegram.

Facility #2: Waste management facility
Incident description: Facility destroyed
Impact: Significant physical damage, but no
obvious fire or release of chemicals. Nearby surface water feature and visible impact on soils.
Preliminary risk screening: Medium (overall)
• Short-term – high risk: contaminated discharge to nearby surface water
• Longer-term – medium risk: persistent
ground contamination
Figure 3. Lyubotyn, Kharkiv Oblast, March 2022.
Image courtesy of Tpyxa News/Twitter.

Facility #3: Aistra petroleum storage and
reserve
Incident description: Fuel fire
Impact: Significant physical damage, fire and
chemical release. No obvious nearby surface
water, but visible impact on soils. At least six
fuel silos destroyed.
Preliminary risk screening: High (overall)
• Short-term – high risk: physical injury from
explosion, inhalation of toxic fumes and
particulates
• Longer-term – medium risk: persistent
ground contamination from cobustion
products, agrochemicals and fuels
Figure 4. Chernihiv, Chernihiv Oblast, March 2022.
Image courtesy of State Emergency Service
of Ukraine/Facebook.

Within urban settings, there are multiple potential sources of pollution and
proportionately more people vulnerable to the risk of exposure to contaminants.
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Observations during survey and clearance operations
by mine action operators on waste, debris, and other
pollution can support remediation planning.
Image courtesy of CEOBS.

Support Through Collaboration
Impact monitoring is required to understand the on-going
environmental risks and damage caused by conflict, yet challenging to conduct on the ground. Remote assessment databases are
important, but these will not be comprehensive and incidents will
be missed, particularly smaller incidents or those occurring in less
populated areas.
As well as organizations collating data using remote tools, local
actors are needed. Given technical and capacity constraints, collaboration and the provision of elementary environmental data and
incident reporting by mine action operators and other civil society
actors can be a useful, additional resource. Mine action operators
could be an important part of such efforts in Ukraine, helping to
report on-the-ground evidence or suspicion of pollution, or environmental damage (see Figure 5). Mine action operators are particularly well-suited to support this given their expertise in data
management systems, evaluating risk, understanding risk priorities, and communicating these risks to local communities.
Supported by guidelines, such as a planned update to IMAS
07.13,12 mine action operators could report and provide eyewitness
accounts of conflict pollution incidents. At a minimum, actions
should be in place to manage risks including:
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1. Non-technical surveys to consider the potential for
chemical pollution to be present in or adjacent to task
areas, with specific questions directed to the local
community and local authority;
2. Health and safety files for task areas to include the
potential for chemical pollution and control measures
to be in place;
3. Site reconnaissance to include a visual inspection
of ground conditions, including checks for the
signs of environmental incidents and risk of environmental harm;
4. Provision of appropriate personnel protection equipment for field staff;
5. Site induction to inform all site staff of anticipated
ground conditions and operating procedures;
6. Maintenance of appropriate records, detailing the
date, location, nature, cause, and extent of the environmental incident and reporting action taken; and
7. Reporting of incidents to landowners or users, and,
where possible, the local authorities or other agencies involved in post-conflict and field assessments.

Mine action operators are not environmental specialists, and collaboration with environBuried
mental partners should be encouraged, both to
drums, tanks,
allow delivery of competency training, where
pipework, or
Evidence of
Waste and
needed, and to disseminate data on conflict
containers
leaks or spills
debris at
pollution. Environmental NGOs in Ukraine,
of fuel or
ground level
chemicals
such as Ecoaction and Environment People
or buried
Law,13 have been investigating and assessing
the environmental impacts of the conflict and
the wider environmental effects. There is also
Soil or water
Iridescent
wide support across civil society organizations
with
sheens (e.g.,
Environmental
in Ukraine for a green recovery policy, acknowldiscoloration
oil/fuel on
incidents
or odor
edging that the repeal or weakening of any envisoil or water)
ronmental legislation in post-conflict recovery
would be unacceptable.14 Additional measures
may be required, when pollution-impacted
Vegetation
Fire
areas are identified or suspected. Under such
dieback and
and
fire
circumstances, operating in these areas may
signs of
damaged
require specialist environmental support or
stress
assets
Dead or
advice, including the development of task-area
gasping fish
in water
specific operating procedures (for example for
bodies
the control of excavated materials, waste, dust,
and drainage) and enhanced local engagement.
To fully support the resolution of the UN
Figure 5. Examples of evidence of environmental incidents or damage.
Environment Assembly addressing conflict
Image courtesy of CEOBS.
pollution,15 data will be needed to inform the
environmental assessments, target remedial action for higher risk
The remote environmental incident monitoring in Ukraine undersites, and enable reconstruction. Pollution can inflict physical, taken by CEOBS to date has been supported by the CEOBS and
psychological, socioeconomic, and cultural harm on individuals Norwegian People’s Aid partnership agreement with the Norwegian
and communities, and an inadequacy of data is one of the barriers Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the United Nations Environment
to assisting victims either in Ukraine or elsewhere.
Programme.
See endnotes page 105
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A BRIEF HISTORY

of Mine Detection Dogs
By Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

S

ince their first use in World War II, the use of Mine
Detection Dogs (MDDs) has been subject to ongoing
debate. How effective are they really in finding mines?
Are they really worth the expense they entail? As with so
many aspects of modern survey and clearance operations,
many of the lessons we continue to learn today have already
been learned in the past. A brief history of the contribution
of MDDs over the past eight decades can help us put their
performance into perspective and understand where they can
add significant value, while also appreciating their limitations.
A Belgian Malinois MDD during a quality control task on the Rejaf
road south of Juba, South Sudan, 2010. Quality control using MDDs was
conducted after mechanical processing and manual visual search.
Image courtesy of Mikael Bold.

World War II
While mines had been used before, World War II was the conflict that saw the landmine coming of age as a major weapons system. The first documented use of MDDs during the Second World
War is not clear. One French source states that the Russians were
first, claiming “that as many as 100,000 mines were detected by
these animals on roads, in towns and villages, and at bridgeheads,”
and, incredibly, “one especially talented dog located almost 2,000
mines in one three-week period.”1 There is little to corroborate
these extravagant claims.
The United Kingdom probably led the way in the early development of a MDD capability. From 1942, the development of mines
with reduced metal content, even the simplest models, such as the
Schützenmine 42, presented a significant detection problem. The
available metal detectors could not be used to reliably detect these
models, especially in heavily metal-contaminated conditions.2,3
Within this context, trials commenced in early 1943 at the new
Obstacle Assault Centre (OAC) where much of the UK research into
mine detection took place. The last of these trials involved searching a 1 kilometer stretch of road using three MDDs. The road was
also searched by a sapper with a No.5 detector. The mine targets
were emplanted twenty-four hours before the trial. The dogs took
thirty-two minutes to complete the task, slower than the sapper
with a detector at twenty-two minutes. However, the dogs found
nine out of ten targets, the detector just four out of ten. Notably,
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the detector could not find Schützenmine 42s, that in the context
of the detectors of the day, were deemed a minimum metal mine.4
The demonstrated potential of the MDD was enough for four Royal
Engineers Dog Platoons to be formed in April 1944 for subsequent
use during Operation Overlord in Normandy and thereafter.5
The record of the Royal Engineers Dog Platoons, from the initial deployment of No.1 Dog Platoon in June 1944 until the end
of the war in northern Germany, was mixed. During clearance of
Carpiquet Airfield, to the west of Caen, between July and August
1944, an inauspicious start saw the MDDs miss numerous mines
and the platoon commander losing his foot in a demining accident.6 MDDs frequently failed to reproduce the capability demonstrated in training in actual field conditions. The heat and the dust
of the former battlefield was deemed particularly challenging for
the dogs. The disappointing performance was acutely felt since the
uneven surface made mechanical roller attachments ineffective,
and the extensive metal contamination, standard for areas that had
seen heavy fighting, made electronic detectors ineffective.7
In November 1944, the Dog Platoons moved to the Netherlands
where eventually all four would work over the winter of 1944–45.
While the Dog Platoons demonstrated their usefulness, they were
deemed “not 100% effective.”8 It was decided that the dogs were
not reliable enough to be used on known minefields but were better suited for “routine checking of suspect areas and the proving

of and delimiting of areas in which mines were rumored to exist.”
To this end, 155 miles of railway line, 73 miles under high-tension
cables and 77,000 square yards, were searched by ‘war dogs’ with
twenty-nine mines located. Building on the lessons of Normandy it
was reconfirmed that using dogs was “fully justified on large areas
of non-metallic anti-personnel mines.”9,10,11 As the Chief Engineer
of the Second Army wrote in December 1944, MDDs “provide the
quickest method of locating minefields and subsequently defining
their limits.”12 Identifying individual mines within a minefield,
however, was less certain. One example of this was a clearance
task in February 1945 where No.2 Dogs Platoon supported 19th
Field Company, Royal Engineers in the clearance of a minefield
containing mines and what could be deemed improvised mines
known as “Picric Pots,” named after the main charge used in the
mines. The dogs found only 112 of the 545 picric pots, and one
hundred of the 333 other mines.13 The importance of the relationship with the handler was repeated consistently in operational
reports. Mines laid more recently were deemed more detectable by
dogs.14 Many of these basic lessons concerning the employment of
dogs remain relevant today.
The United States also sought to develop what was termed an
M-Dog program in 1943. A number of training methods were
tried, including positive and negative reinforcement. The immediate results were not promising. A demonstration at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, resulted in the “M-Dogs” missing twenty percent of
the mine targets. The dogs also indicated incorrectly where there
were no mines another twenty percent of the time.15 Consistent
with later experience the dogs did, however, indicate on the general presence of a mined area emplaced eight months previously.
On this basis, 228th Engineer Mine Detection Company deployed

A labrador from a Royal Engineers Dogs Platoon checking
the railway line between America and Deurne in eastern
Holland, 25 November 1944. MDDs were deemed more
effective at searching areas with suspected nuisance
mining rather than finding individual mines in a minefield.
MDDs were partially effective at detecting individual
minimum metal mines not laid in a pattern.

“Bobs,” a black labrador from No.1 Dog Platoon searches
for mines in Bayeux, Normandy, 5 July 1944. The white
cones on the handler’s belt are used to mark where
the dog has indicated for subsequent investigation by
a detector and excavation. The Royal Engineers Dogs
Platoons in Normandy did not perform as well as had
been hoped during their training.
Image courtesy of the Imperial War Museum (B.6501).

one hundred dogs to the Fifth Army in Italy in June 1944.16
Unfortunately “substantial” casualties and unsatisfactory further training and testing led to the withdrawal of the company
by September 1944 and its disbandment in February 1945, even
though the use and impact of mines in all theatres was increasing.
Almost three decades later, the US Army would continue to assess
these efforts as flawed, “Due to a lack of knowledge of animal
behavior, training and employment technique, the concept failed
to work in combat.”17
How MDDs should be trained was and remains an area of
debate. In the United States, pain was used as a means of conditioning the dogs not to touch any potential hazard. This was
sometimes referred to as the “repulsion” method,18 also referred
to as “aversive control.”19 In the United Kingdom, the War Dogs
Training School course at Melton Mowbray, focused on conditioning behavior by means of reward over a four-month program.20
Even today, although the principles of canine learning are more
generally accepted, how those principles should be applied is not
fully agreed. 21 Which breeds were most suitable was also subject
to debate during the war. A 1947 British Army report stated “that
from the experience of Officers and men in the Dog Platoons, that
for mine detection, Labradors and Labrador Crosses are likely to
be the best type, other things being equal.”22 One principle that
was agreed at this time was the “One Man, One Dog” rule, where
individual dogs would only work with the same handler.23,24

Image courtesy of the Imperial War Museum (B.12078).

ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022

51

Lance Corporal Lewis Raborn and his dog ‘Nick’ search for mines and booby traps in Vietnam in 1971. The United
States had used “War Dogs,” including “Scout Dogs” in a range of roles, but the use of dogs as a means to detect
mines and booby traps came relatively late in the conflict and with mixed results.
Image courtesy of the US Department of Defense.

Post-War
The continuing problem of finding landmines meant that
research and debate continued during the decades following the
Second World War. In 1946, the UK Ministry of Supply Committee
recognized that “land mines were likely to be extremely difficult
obstacles in future land warfare,”25 largely due to the fact that
“direct detection” was “extremely difficult.”26 The British efforts
were eventually led by anatomist Sir Solly Zuckerman and those
of the United States by Joseph Banks Rhine, the founder of the

discipline of parapsychology. Zuckerman concluded that MDDs
would not be of practical use for landmine detection. Rhine concluded that MDDs did potentially have utility but the US Army
Engineer Research and Development Laboratory at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, ceased funding in 1953 in order to concentrate on
mechanical methods.27 There is evidence that MDDs were used
to a limited extent during the Korean War, for example by the
Australian Army.28

Vietnam
By 1967, mine and booby traps were causing an increasing proportion of casualties among US ground troops in Vietnam.29,30 In
May 1967, the Chief of US Army Research and Development tasked
the US Army Limited War Laboratory (U.S.ALWL) to re-examine
the feasibility of using dogs to detect mines and booby traps in
combat conditions.31 The United States' use of MDDs in part grew
out of a more general use of “Scout Dogs.” These were originally
used to track the scent of an individual laying a mine or booby
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trap. While it was hard to prove, at least some elements of the military also believed that dogs could use their vision to detect trip
wires, and some asserted that dogs were able to detect trip wires on
touch without initiating. One captain commanding C Company,
1st Battalion, 52nd Infantry, believed labrador retrievers used as
tracker dogs often were able to detect trip wires.32 (Trip wire detection by MDDs was also claimed during the Second World War.)33
From January 1967 to May 1968, it was reported that of 119 dogs

killed during operations in South Vietnam, “only seven were killed found approximately 25 meters down the trail. Approximately 50
by boobytraps.”34 Within the 9th Infantry Division operational meters further down the trail Abby failed to alert on a 35-pound
area on the Mekong Delta, one study claimed that scout dogs had anti-tank mine, that was submerged in a mud puddle. The mine
a distinguished record alerting for booby traps. During a four- was visually detected by the coverman. Approximately 75 meters
month period from October 1968 to January 1969, scout dogs were further down the trail Abby alerted and detected a buried 81 mm
used on a total of 771 missions on the ground. The dogs alerted HE round. Finally, after moving only approximately 25 meters
to booby traps fifty-three times. The report writer estimated this down the trail, Abby alerted and refuzed to continue. A thorsaved 127 casualties. Such evidence alongside a pressing need to ough search revealed a concealed 500-pound bomb about 10
find any and every means available to reliably detect mines and meters off the trail.”41
booby traps was enough to justify a renewal of systematic training
Such mixed results were not always presented unvarnished in
and deployment of MDDs in the US military.35
Washington. In June 1971, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., Director of Defense
The United States started actively training and using dogs to Research and Engineering, attempting to secure the 1972 budget allodetect mines and booby traps in Vietnam in 1969. 36,37 Not all cation before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
were convinced. In October 1969, Major General Williamson for the House of Representatives, claimed that “dogs have proven to be
of the 25th Infantry Division, known as one of the most con- superior time and time again.”42 However the truth of the matter was
scientious units when it came to mines and booby traps, noted that no means of reliable detection for the variety of mines and booby
that “in an effort to detect mines, rather than detonating them, traps in the range of operational environments existed, whether
the Division tested various devices of dubious value. Presently it was electronic metal detectors or MDDs. The Assistant Division
undergoing evaluation is the performance of mine and tunnel Commander of the 1st Marine Division concluded after their 1969–
detector dog teams.”38 Nevertheless the trial of “mine and tunnel” 1971 deployment that “the 1st Marine Division’s strenuous efforts—
dogs in the 25th Division was deemed a qualified success. 39 Just including troop indoctrination, landmine warfare school, contact
as in other military
teams and mine and
“On 03 June 1971, Abby, 7k39, while clearing a trail for
and humanitarian
boobytrap dogs—did
B/3-5 alerted. An 8 inch HE artillery round connected to
operational
envinot solve the probronments, dogs were
lem. The best we
a tripwire was found approximately 25 meters down the
found to be a useful
can conclude is that
trail. Approximately 50 meters further down the trail
tool when partnered
these efforts greatly
Abby failed to alert on a 35-pound anti-tank mine, that
with
experienced
reduced what might
was
submerged
in
a
mud
puddle.
The
mine
was
visually
handlers but were
have been the casunever a full solution.
alty figures if they had
detected by the coverman. Approximately 75 meters furIn Vietnam, MDDs
not been vigorously
ther down the trail Abby alerted and detected a buried 81
tended to be used
pursued.”43 Two years
mm HE round. Finally, after moving only approximately
primarily for daily
later, after almost a
25 meters down the trail, Abby alerted and refuzed to conroute searches but
decade of attempted
were also employed
counter-mine innotinue. A thorough search revealed a concealed 500-pound
in tunnels. While
vation during a coun41
bomb about 10 meters off the trail.”
they could help
ter-insurgency, the
identify hidden arms caches, they were understandably not truth remained that “a need exists to develop an easily applied,
effective in identifying when those caches were booby trapped, reliable, and effective means to detect mines and boobytraps
most likely due to a confuzed scent picture. It was also suspected hidden or camouflaged in field environments.”44 Arguably that
that MDDs could struggle to differentiate between the odor of a remains just as true today.
large anti-tank mine and any anti-personnel mines positioned
After the withdrawal of US ground combat forces from Vietnam
around it. This was assessed to have led to a handler initiating an by 1973, the United States sought to build on the hard-won lessons
anti-personnel mine in the autumn of 1971.40 It was also found of Vietnam and did not disregard MDDs as had largely been the
that dogs were unlikely to indicate on items placed by the Viet case after World War II. In March 1973, Field Manual 7-41 Mine
Cong in saturated potholes. During the rainy season this method and Tunnel Dog Training and Employment was published.45 The
of nuisance mine laying was a substantial problem. This experi- publication underlined the need to select dogs with suitable temence was underlined by a 1971 assessment entitled “Mine Dog peraments, and the importance of the partnership between the
Successes and Failures” that listed individual case studies from dog and the handler. Notably the publication claimed that MDDs
the field. One case study incorporated examples of success and were suitable to detect trip wires 46 whereas now this is often confailure during the same search task:
sidered ill advised.47,48 The manual also rather hopefully asserted
“On 03 June 1971, Abby, 7k39, while clearing a trail for B/3-5 that “handlers should be able to effectively employ their dogs over
alerted. An 8 inch HE artillery round connected to a tripwire was all types of terrain,”49 while both during World War II and today it
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is recognized that certain terrain pose a challenge for MDDs. For
example, when searching railway lines, the aggregate could cumulatively damage the dog’s paws. MDDs can also struggle within
vegetation, not only due to inhibiting line of sight contact with a
handler, but also because certain vegetation can hurt dogs. Thorn
bushes in Afghanistan were known to be “no-go” for MDDs.
In humanitarian mine action (HMA), MDDs tend to work land
that has been processed, often with all vegetation removed.
In 1974, one study posited that dogs responded to a range of cues
including ancillary human scent and disturbed earth. It was believed
this was why dogs, at least in test conditions, would miss few mines
in their path but why they would also give frequent false alarms.50
The US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development
Command in Fort Belvoir, were tasked to develop techniques and

procedures for the use of “landmine and explosive boobytrap detector dogs.”51 An extensive three-year program was completed in
1976. “For practically all tasks to which highly trained canines may
be assigned, the importance of the handler/dog team concept cannot be overemphasized. This concept is of particular importance in
land mine and booby trap detection applications where neither dog
nor man can operate effectively alone.”52 The handler’s visual sense,
combined with sufficient knowledge of the mines and booby traps
they were looking for were deemed essential, especially when dealing with threats such as trip wires. This approach still endures in the
US military. In 2004, all Military Working Dogs (MWDs) were still
viewed as a means to “produce a highly sophisticated and versatile
extension of a soldier’s own senses.”53

MDDs and HMA
One of the first known uses of dogs in HMA was by the commercial company RONCO, which had facilities near Peshawar in
Pakistan in early 1989.54 In time, the United Nations established
“Mine Dog Groups” that incorporated four dogs and handlers along
with a section of deminers. The main benefit was the elimination
of areas suspected to be mined but which were shown to contain
no explosive hazards. Many of the early principles of using dogs in
HMA were established in Afghanistan, including using at least two

different dogs to search an area in order to increase confidence that
there were no mines present.55 Among the results claimed, it was
reported that from a pool of fourteen German Shepherds, along
with their Afghan and Pakistani handlers, 137 kilometers of road
around the town of Urgun in Patika Province were searched, and
734 mines were removed and destroyed.56
As the number of demining projects grew throughout the
1990s and 2000s, MDDs would be found in most countries where
there were programs, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 57
Cambodia, 58,59 Angola, Lebanon, and Sudan. In 2002, the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
estimated that 750 dogs were at work in the mine action sector in twenty-three countries.60 By 2005, that estimate had
changed to 1,000 dogs in twenty countries.61 HMA programs tended to favor Belgian Malinois and German
Shepherd breeds,62 although labradors and spaniels
were at one time preferred as explosive detection
dogs (EDDs).63 In time, Belgian Malinois would
also be increasingly favored for military improvised explosive device (IED) detection tasks.64 By
2003, the GICHD, recognizing that “the use of
dogs for mine detection has expanded dramatically in the last ten years,”65 developed a number of International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) covering general use, procedures, and
accreditation. Some ways of employing MDDs,
A member of the 577th Engineer Battalion conducts quality control of an area of
mechanically processed land near Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, 2004. The MDD, ‘Cinda’ is
on a long leash. MDDs are often used to confirm
or at least give a degree of confidence of where
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are not.
Image courtesy of the US Department of Defense.
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A Norwegian People’s Aid Belgian Malinois on a long leash checking part of a hazardous area between the minefield
pattern and the minefield fence after manual clearance has finished, Jordan, April 2014. MDDs performed a useful role
searching areas where no pattern minefield was suspected but where a few mines might have been moved from the
main pattern over time. Belgian Malinois have become increasingly preferred for both mine and IED detection roles.
Image courtesy of the GICHD.

such as the use of Remote Explosive Scent Tracing (REST),66 where
dogs would check filters that captured odors from locations in the
field, only partially caught on, and were later abandoned.
In 2005, the GICHD published a study “designed to address the
overall question: ‘why do dogs miss some mines?’”67 Based on a
trial near Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2002 and 2003, the study remains
impressive in its effort to recognize ongoing debates about MDDs
and find evidence to provide answers. The factors studied included
weather variables (temperature, wind, humidity, rainfall, and
ground saturation), mine depth, mine size (explosive charge size),
vegetation density, and time of indication. The trial confirmed that
“humidity is a key factor influencing the success of mine detection by dogs.”68 “Find rates through the morning were linked to
humidity…although the relationship was complex. Humidity
declined steeply from dawn until about midday. Find rates were
high around the time that the sun first hit the ground (when overnight moisture was evaporating from the ground surface). Find
rates were lower through the rest of the morning but increased as
humidity declined.”69 While similar challenges were apparent for
IED detection dogs, the scent of homemade explosive presented an
extra problem.70
In 2015, one demining organization pointed out that the use of
MDDs had not been successful in locating anti-vehicle mines in
Herāt, Afghanistan. After the original use of MDDs, it was stated

that a total of seventeen accidents occurred, killing sixteen and
injuring fifteen people up to November 2010.71 It has been asserted
that “MDDs have a poor record in Afghanistan for clearing antivehicle mines. They were used in Jebrail in Herāt Province where
minimum metal mines were missed. Although numerous reasons
have been identified for the mines being missed, the environmental conditions in Afghanistan are challenging for MDDs and
tests have shown that their performance can be inconsistent.” 72,73
Nevertheless, in 2018, the IMAS Review Board approved a revised
Animal Detection Systems (ADS) IMAS that confirmed two separate searches by an “ADS unit” would be sufficient to consider an
area as clear.74
More recently the term MDD has been subsumed into a wider
term, ADS.75 The IMAS that used to refer to MDD now refer to
ADS. GICHD assessments continue to acknowledge the “benefits
and limitations” of ADS.76 Innovation continues, with the Swiss
organization Digger developing the SMART MDD system, which
consists of an embedded global positioning system (GPS) and
audio system on a harness, enabling free running MDDs to work
off leash. Use of unmanned aerial vehicles to provide visual oversight of the dog, alongside recording the track of the dog by GPS,
have also been trialed in order to try to allay concerns about the
dog covering the ground correctly.77
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An MDD and handler conducting a QC search on a long leash in Tajikistan, June 2013. The relationship between the
MDD and their handler is essential for MDDs to be effective.
Image courtesy of the GICHD.

Conclusion
In 1946, a post-war report on the British use of MDDs stated
that they were “not a satisfactory or complete answer to the problem.” However, the report also emphasized the limitations of
“electronic detection” and “prodding,” and states that “there is at
present no real answer” to the problem of finding mines.78 Today,
in areas of heavy metal contamination, and especially when clearing minimum metal mines, we are still reduced to conducting
laborious and slow full excavation of ground. Within this context, where we lack the means to reliably detect and discriminate
mines, MDDs remain a valuable tool for demining operators. Just
as in the 1940s, MDDs form part of a team with a handler. Both
require careful selection, training, and accreditation, and the dogs
also require significant additional logistical support from kennels
to veterinary care. MDDs will also always be limited by weather
conditions, whether it is humidity, wind, or heat. Certain environments with a range of scents will also be difficult for MDDs.
Even today it is not categorically confirmed whether the dog only
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discriminates scent or whether it is a combination of cues.79 As a
US Army Engineer report stated in March 1945, after a visit to the
British War Dog Training Center, “No dog can guarantee to work
perfectly at all times.”80
MDDs have undoubtedly made a significant contribution to
the effort to find and remove mines. It could be reasonably argued
that this contribution is more concerned with giving confidence of
where mines and ERW are not, or indicating a general area where
mines are, such as a minefield edge, rather than specifically identifying where individual mines are in a minefield. This contribution
can of course save significant time and money, but it should not be
misrepresented. MDDs remain part of the solution, but they are not
the solution. As the US military itself concluded in 2004, “MDDs
must not be seen as a fail-safe panacea…It must be understood that
MDDs are merely an additional tool to enhance the productivity of
mine clearance operations…MDDs are not a stand-alone system
for conducting mine clearance operations.”81
See endnotes page 105

A Belgian Malinois MDD during a quality control task on
the Rejaf road south of Juba, South Sudan, 2010. Quality
control using MDDs was conducted after mechanical
processing and manual visual search.
Image courtesy of Mikael Bold.
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CLEAR THEN GR W:
Integrating Mine Action with
Food Security in Northeast Syria
By Katarina Cvikl Balić [ ITF Enhancing Human Security ]

A vegetable garden in early spring in Northeast Syria.
Image courtesy of ITF.
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O

ver the past several years, considerable attention within
the mine action community and in the wider development
sector has been devoted to conceptualizing mine action
interventions within the broader sustainable development goals
(SDGs), or more recently, the so-called triple nexus.1 Aiming to find
linkages between, for instance, clearance efforts and food security
is not a new concept. This article, however, looks at the operationalization of these links through an integrated mine action and
agricultural recovery program within Northeast Syria (NES). 2
The mine action community, including mine action organizations and traditional mine
action donors, has invested considerable efforts into understanding how mine action can
support the SDGs3 or the humanitarian development peace nexus. Also, it has been wellnoted that mine action should not exist in silos but should seek to leverage its operations in collaboration with broader sustainable development and peace efforts.4 However,
moving from a conceptual understanding of this idea to implementation has not been
without its challenges. This is due in part to several factors, including the continuation
of strongly-rooted practices within mine action, which are based on decades of expertise
and strong relations within the community of practice, both internationally and in local
capacities, but with limited outreach to the broader development sector. Additionally,
limited mandates of mine action organizations make it difficult for operators to build
internal expertise around the triple nexus, justify engagement in activities that traditionally are outside the scope of mine action, or make it difficult to partner and coordinate with other sustainable development or peace-focused organizations. Furthermore,
donors specifically operating in mine action and those operating in the development sector may view their activities as autonomous and may have competing priorities.
Before the emergence of the SDGs, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)5 had adopted
this innovative thinking and attempted to reconceptualize seemingly “hard” mine action
operations into “soft,” people-centered approaches, focusing on community needs more
holistically. For years, ITF has worked to mobilize resources and address a wide array of
donors and supporters whose interests lie in human security more broadly, rather than
strictly within the mine action sphere. This multidimensional approach paved the way
for ITF’s development of the "Clear then Grow" model, bringing together mine action
response and agricultural recovery. The Clear then Grow model was developed specifically for the NES context between 2018 and 2019, shortly after the liberation from the ISIS
occupation, and ahead of the October 2019 Turkish military action along the Operation
Peace Spring border areas,6 as well as the global COVID-19 pandemic. The integrated
model aims to present mine action as an enabling factor for sustainable development
activities and long-term peace. Although developed for NES, it may be particularly relevant for other countries such as Ukraine where food security is of global concern.
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An explosive item identified in a former agricultural
field in immediate proximity to cultivated land.
Image courtesy of ITF.

Clear then Grow
The Clear then Grow project started in 2019 with financial support provided by donors usually operating outside of mine action,
namely the Austrian Development Agency, the Slovenian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and the Knights of Columbus. The three donors
have generously supported this project in a phased approach since
its inception in 2018. Phase I focused on setting up the mine action
side of the project (clearance/explosive ordnance risk education
(EORE)) while in phase II, an agricultural component was added to
complement the mine action response. The project’s phase II ended
in August 2022, and ITF may continue with phase III, which will
seek to expand and build on lessons learned thus far.7
ITF communicated extensively with other mine action actors
and stakeholders operating in NES and conducted field visits and
surveys, finding that there were significant aspects in which mine
action efforts in operation between 2018 and 2019 could be complemented with sustainable development activities. Contamination in
NES is found in both urban and rural areas and includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance contamination located in border areas8 or where battles to expel ISIS were
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fought. Considering the absence of a national mine action authority at the time9 and lack of a centralized prioritization system or
tasking, mine action activities in NES were mainly coordinated
through the NES Mine Action Sub Working Group between mine
action organizations,10 and locally through civil councils at city
levels and the komin,11 or commune at community levels. In the
absence of a formal mine action center, the coordination process
depended on individual mine action organizations working in
NES, with their own policies and procedures.
For ITF, strong community liaison and participation was seen
as essential to a successful integrated project; not only to obtain or
cross-check information on potential contamination and appropriate additional support, but also to garner community acceptance.
Until 2019, relatively speaking, significant international attention and clearance priorities in NES were devoted to urban clearance and clearing vital infrastructure. However, as re-confirmed
recently by Humanity & Inclusion’s Syria report, over a third of
explosive accidents occurred in agricultural areas.12 As of 2022,
the full extent of contamination in Syria, including NES, remains

unknown.13 It is estimated, however, that over 27 million square
meters of land in NES are contaminated with explosive hazards,
and this does not consider re-contamination in Operation Peace
Spring areas.14 Furthermore, explosive hazard contamination is
often found in agricultural land, preventing its use and development. ITF’s exchange with local counterparts and their active participation resulted in numerous requests to focus on agricultural
areas—areas of contamination that had not yet been prioritized.
Looking more in-depth into the opportunities and threats
related to agricultural contamination, context analysis confirmed
NES’s importance to the country’s agricultural output and the
debilitating effects this sector has suffered due to the ISIS occupation. A majority of the population in NES continue to base their
livelihoods on agriculture. Previously referred to as the breadbasket of Syria, NES used to account for seventy percent of Syria’s
wheat and grain production.15

Bread is a staple of Syrian cuisine and inaccessibility of wheat,
bread, or bakeries is often linked with food insecurity and poverty. The ISIS occupation had a multifaceted impact on agricultural
livelihoods. ISIS looted and destroyed agricultural tools and equipment, cut down or burned orchards, forests, wheat fields, and other
crops, and rendered agricultural land inaccessible with the laying
of IED belts. Furthermore, irrigation pathways were interrupted by
conflict and with dry, hot summers and cold winters, the land had
become inaccessible, drought-ridden, and had not been cultivated
for several years. By engaging a local partner and relying on local
expertise, an agricultural and food security assessment was carried
out to identify the best approaches that would help to reinvigorate
the affected areas and assist the affected rural communities.
It was at the intersection of these findings that the Clear then
Grow approach was developed with the purpose to maximize
the impact of clearance efforts in NES. Given the particularly

Community members during a training on
sustainable agricultural practices.
Image courtesy of ITF.
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“Clear then Grow” would not be possible without
constant coordination with local communities.
Image courtesy of ITF.

gruesome legacy of the ISIS occupation and profound and multifaceted humanitarian crises, it became evident that the sustainable
development impact of mine action itself would be lacking without
follow-on activities. Put simply, the beneficiaries of mine action
efforts—especially clearance efforts—would be unable to utilize
the released land productively or grow crops without external
assistance due to a lack of financial resources. Even the simplest
and cheapest agricultural inputs had become unaffordable.
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The context, however, drastically changed in autumn 2019 with
the onset of Operation Peace Spring, when all clearance efforts
in NES were suspended. The suspension and evacuation of mine
action organizations was prolonged due to the security risks. Just
as organizations were planning their return to the area in 2020,
the global COVID-19 pandemic halted these plans. These developments exacerbated humanitarian needs in NES and underpinned
the need for an integrated approach in which the local population

depended less on humanitarian assistance and
increased their resilience. Although a very challenging time, the ITF project team was able to
work with donors and adjust its response, namely
ensuring the project relied on local assistance and
expertise, with the long-term goal of national
ownership.
The integrated Clear then Grow response was
first and foremost, people-centered, and focused on
extensive dialogue and outreach with local communities involving mukhtars,16 village elders, vulnerable groups, komin, civil councils, and special
interest groups. Additionally, mine action operations including EORE and non-technical survey
were a crucial part of the integrated approach. The
Explosive hazards found
ITF project team, including expat staff, devoted
Image courtesy of ITF.
considerable time to building local relations based
on appropriate risk assessments—living with the
community as closely as possible, splitting bread and drinking chai. Trust was
built over time, and this also paved the way for a local partner with existing expertise in food security and livelihood support to develop a context-specific agricultural recovery intervention.
With agricultural needs assessments in the planned area of operations showing that the two main impediments to farming were contamination (confirmed
or suspected) and a lack of financial resources and/or available agricultural
inputs (e.g., seeds or seedlings, fertilizers, water, farming tools), it was important
for agricultural recovery to encourage income generation within the community. The value chain approach to agricultural recovery, which followed clearance efforts, included provision of support to barley farmers, sheep herders, and
homeowners with vegetable gardens. This was implemented in recently cleared
areas or areas impacted by explosive hazards contamination, following close
coordination between the mine action team and the agricultural team. Direct
support to farmers was provided in the form of know-how and technical knowledge (e.g., pest management or animal-friendly sheep rearing), but also basic
agricultural inputs. Following ISIS occupation, countless farmers did not have
shovels and hoes, and providing them with these tools was invaluable. Farmers
were also provided with seeds, fertilizers, and means for pest management, or
with sheep and adequate fodder, depending on their family’s livelihood.
This approach also included supporting small agribusiness development to
boost sustainability within the community. Vulnerable populations living below
the poverty line, including internally displaced persons (IDP) populations living
in informal settlements, were provided with vouchers that were redeemable at
local small businesses. This brought significant engagement and resources into
communities that were previously living with the debilitating impact of explosive hazards, inaccessibility of their land, and the psychological impact of living
in contaminated areas. Although the scale of contamination in the areas ITF
worked in was not large, accidents that had occurred previously continued to
instill fear within the community and prevented civilians from working their
land. Overall, 340 families in two communities affected by explosive hazards
were provided with support to help them rebuild their agricultural livelihoods.
Over half of the families that received support were households headed by
women, often supporting their extended families.

and removed in Northeast Syria.
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Clearance staff ensure that explosive hazards
are removed and temporarily stored safely.
Image courtesy of Arne Hodalič/ITF.
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Challenges
The scale of the Clear then Grow project was relatively small, and may not have been broad enough to achieve full self-sustainability
within the targeted communities. Additional support in the forms of establishing or refurbishing silos and mills, and ensuring reliable
irrigation pathways is still required. Yet, the project did ensure that hundreds of families have directly improved food security and are
able to subsist on agriculture again. A more in-depth impact analysis is ongoing, but regular monitoring and follow-up mechanisms have
so far indicated that for many of the families, the support provided means that there is no longer the need to resort to negative coping
strategies: borrowing money, selling the few assets they own, consuming low-quality food, reducing the number of meals per day, and
stopping schooling of family members. With improved economic outlooks, extremist groups hold less appeal and this in turn leads to
decreased violence.
With implementation of the Clear then Grow project, ITF encountered challenges and gained valuable lessons learned, all of which may
help inform similar, future interventions.

1
2

3

Resource mobilization for such initiatives is not without its challenges. In contrast to focusing on traditional
mine action operations, and engaging with an agricultural partner that would ensure their own funding under
a separate but complementary initiative, ITF’s approach
was to do it “under one roof” and to ensure funding for
the entire intervention—from clearance to agricultural
initiatives. Trying to align separately funded organizations through mine action and non-mine action components would present an even bigger challenge with
competing timelines, funding cycles, and/or unpredictable or contradictory donor requirements, etc.

The disproportionality of costs between mine action
and/or clearance efforts vs. agricultural support must
be addressed. One of the challenges ITF experienced
in its efforts to secure financial resources for the Clear
then Grow program was the perception of costliness of
mine action efforts (especially clearance) as compared
to follow-on, development activities. While this may not
be a new challenge for the mine action community, it
becomes even more pronounced when raising funds for
a joint program. An important part of the solution lies in
continued awareness raising among donors, highlighting the complexities of mine action and why the costs of
clearance efforts are relatively high, while at the same
time ensuring that funds are used as efficiently and
transparently as possible.
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There needs to be closer cooperation between the mine
action and wider humanitarian and development sectors.
There can be a disconnect between organizations clustered under the humanitarian and development sectors.
Mine action is typically organized as the sub-cluster to the
protection cluster in a humanitarian response. In order to
ensure optimal efficiency, from initial planning stages to
conducting operations and follow-on development activities, it would be beneficial for all actors involved to be in
close communication and cooperation from the outset.
This is especially true in areas of operation where there are
no mine action centers or authorities, as other operators
in the area may have information pertaining to potential
contamination. Mine action partners, on the other hand,
could share their work on agricultural lands for further food
security/livelihoods initiatives. Regular exchange between
organizations working locally could help bridge the gap in
developing relevant partnerships and may enhance mine
action’s integration into triple nexus initiatives.

4
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Local partnerships and expertise are key. Local knowledge on everything from potential contamination to
cultural dynamics is vital for a program’s success. These
can include knowledge of local grievances or tensions that
may exist between host and IDP populations, local tribes,
or other population groups. Engaging local partners that
do not, for example, acknowledge the different needs of
host and IDP populations or demonstrate an understanding of the need to “do no harm,” may further exacerbate
intracommunal grievances that inadvertently result in the
escalation of tensions within the community. This can have
a major impact on a local community’s acceptance of an
organization and influence future mine action operations
and programming. It is also important to understand what
the partner(s) can or cannot bring to the table. As experienced by ITF, there needs to be more rigor in measuring an
integrated approach impact and the mechanisms and tools
that need to be applied.

Beneficiaries of Clear then Grow.
Images courtesy of ITF.

While ITF implemented the Clear then Grow program specifically in NES, we believe that the program could be applied in other
regional contexts where contamination is impacting agricultural
communities. Additionally, ITF considers that this is only one
example of how mine action organizations and donors can look
toward more integrated approaches. The Clear then Grow program

is a model that encourages other actors to begin practically addressing not only the challenges, but also the opportunities presented by
integrating mine action into the wider development sector in the
interest of future mine action operations and for the benefit of the
communities we aim to support.
See endnotes page 107

Katarina Cvikl Balić
Head of Implementation Office in Iraq
ITF Enhancing Human Security
www.itf.si
Katarina Cvikl Balić is Head of Implementation Office in Iraq for ITF Enhancing Human Security, leading
the development and implementation of ITF’s projects in Iraq and Northeast Syria. Her portfolio currently
includes managing ITF’s project in the West Bank. She joined ITF in 2015 after working for a non-profit in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cvikl Balić holds a master’s degree in International Development from the University
of Manchester with a focus on post-conflict reconstruction.
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GENDER and

PERATI NAL EFFICIENCY

By Raphaela Lark, David Hewitson [ Fenix Insight, Ltd. ], and
Dominic Wolsey [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

T

his study explores the relationship between gender and operational efficiency in the context of
staff in field-based mine action roles. The aim of the study is to address stereotypes and unproven
assumptions that may still exist in the mine action sector regarding women’s performance and
availability to work in certain field-based roles. Operational efficiency was investigated using two key
indicators: individual operational productivity and availability to work. Operational and human resource
data was collected from fourteen country programs from four separate mine action organizations across
four continents. A quantitative analysis of the data found no meaningful difference in operational productivity or availability to work in field-based roles in mine action based on gender.

Introduction
The participation of women in mine action activities has increased
substantially over the last decade. Mines Action Canada conducted
a study which collated data from twelve operators in 2019 showing
that globally, around 20 percent of mine action staff are women.1
However, there is still a long way to go to increase gender balance
in mine action in line with the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
Agenda’s participation call and Sustainable Development Goal 5.2 In
the same study published by Mines Action Canada, gender balance
was described as “significantly better” in headquarters, finance, and
administrative roles as opposed to clearance roles.3 This is in line
with other research, which points toward clearance as being the
most male-dominated pillar of mine action.4
Stereotypes and unproven assumptions about women’s performance and availability in certain field-based roles persist in some
parts of the sector. Arguments are made about women’s physical

strength relative to men, slower clearance,
or time taken off work, which are then cited
as potential downsides to the recruitment
of women in deminer or searcher roles. It is
sometimes assumed that women in the mine
action sector take more time off because of
maternity leave or other caregiving responsibilities. These claims
limit progress toward increasing women’s access to employment in
mine action. Furthermore, although anecdotal, evidence indicates
increasing global recognition that employing women can be beneficial to land release activities, data has not yet been formally analyzed to investigate this until now. This study aims to address this
gap by exploring the relationship between gender and operational
efficiency in the context of field-based staff.5

Defining Operational Efficiency
Efficiency is generally defined as the ratio between the level of
effort put into an activity or process and the level of output generated by that activity or process.6 For the purposes of this study, the
process of interest is the one in which the threat of mines or other
explosive ordnance (EO) in a hazard area is reduced to an acceptable level through technical survey or clearance activities. More
specifically, this study looks at whether there is any difference in
the performance of men and women in implementing technical
survey and clearance activities that rely on human effort, such as
the use of detectors, locators, excavation, and raking methods.
The output of the land release process is “land” usually measured
in square meters. The input effort is measured in the amount of
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time spent by the deminers engaged in clearing that area.7 One of
the most common indicators used to measure human performance
in land release work is m 2/deminer/day. The indicator is itself a
measure of efficiency—m 2 is the output; a deminer-day is a measure of input effort. A deminer who consistently delivers a higher
number of m 2/day can be said to be more efficient than another
who delivers less output in the same amount of time.
It is important to recognize that the speed with which land is
checked can be one measure of success, but it is more important
that such land is clear of explosive hazards. A deminer who clears
land quickly but misses threat items would be failing to meet
basic quality requirements. While such a statement is obvious and

important, it should also be noted that it is uncommon for such a
situation to arise in most mine action organizations. Each square
meter is re-checked, often more than once, as part of internal
supervisory and quality management processes. It is also important that the rate of progress is not prioritized over the safety of
deminers. The organizations providing data for this study are all
recognized as meeting international standards, including applying rigorous internal quality and safety checking procedures. For
the purposes of this study, it was assumed that the square meters
reported in the provided data met quality requirements.
There are many dimensions of efficiency that can be investigated,
including those relating to cost. This study has not attempted to
disentangle the many facets of direct and indirect cost and the
allocation of those costs to mine action operations. This is partly
because of the difficulty in doing so, and in obtaining agreement
among operators on these questions, but more so because any
analysis of efficiency in relation to survey and clearance must, at its
base, engage with the issue of practical productivity. If one deminer
clears more land faster than another, for a similar cost, then they
must be more cost efficient. By focusing on this fundamental aspect
of operational efficiency, the results of this study will inform other

researchers who may wish to engage more fully with economic or
social aspects of the employment of men and women.
In terms of output, the more deminers are available, and the
more days of effort they deliver, the greater the total area of land
that they will deliver. In simple arithmetical terms, the fundamental production relationship can be described as:
Production (P) = Number of productive resources (N) x
Unit productivity (U) x Working time (T)

For there to be a difference in the productive output of one
deminer (N = 1) compared with another, one deminer would have
to either deliver higher productivity (U) within a similar time to
the other or be available to work for more time (T) at a similar level
of productivity, or a combination of the two. This study investigates
both factors—whether there is any evidence to suggest that there is
a difference in individual productivity between men and women,
and whether there is any difference in the availability to work
between men and women. To do so the project focused on two key
indicators: 1) daily output measured in m 2 and 2) the proportion of
workdays available for work, both of which are routinely measured,
recorded, and reported by mine action operators (MAOs).
The two research questions that were addressed were:

Research Question (RQ) 1: Is there a difference in operational productivity between men and women?
Research Question (RQ) 2: Is there a difference in availability to work between men and women?

General Management of the Study
The study was managed in three phases. The first phase consisted of interviews with MAOs to establish their willingness
to participate in the study and the likely availability of suitable
data. Interviews were conducted with nine women and thirteen
men from six different MAOs. Sample data was requested from
participating organizations and initial analysis was carried out
to improve understanding of the suitability and limitations of
the available data, and to refine the study inclusion criteria and
analysis methods. It was agreed that all operational data would
be anonymized to maintain the confidentiality of MAOs, programs, and personnel.
The second phase consisted of the main data collection activity:

re-engaging with participating MAOs to define the required characteristics of study data, to obtain the data, and to follow up with
questions about any aspects of the data that were not clear. Data
was collected from fourteen country programs from four separate MAOs. These country programs are situated in eleven countries spanning the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe.
The final phase of the study involved analysis of the data that
met the inclusion criteria, review of the results, and preparation of
this report. The methodology for this study, including inclusion
criteria for the data, is set out in detail in an annex available at
the end of this article.

Research Question 1: Is there a difference in operational productivity
between men and women?
By comparing the operational productivity of women and men
at a deminer level, the first research question looks at U, the rate
at which product is produced (usually known as “productivity”).
Operational data from six country programs satisfied the inclusion criteria which considered differences between tasks, team
composition, and minimum number of days worked.8 Clearance

methodologies include one deminer one lane (ODOL) with detector, sub-surface battle area clearance (BAC), and other mixed excavation and detection approaches. Within the data, twenty-three
teams from six country programs yielded a total of 7,575 “personday” values that met the inclusion criteria.
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Relative Area Cleared By Gender
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Figure 1: Percentage of days per gender by area cleared (normalized by team). The performance results for men
and women approximate to a normal distribution curve in both cases (women: μ= 0.970, σ = 0.367; men: μ= 1.028,
σ = 0.401). The difference between means (μ) is negligible, indicating that there is no meaningful difference in
operational productivity by deminer based on gender.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.

Findings
Figure 1 displays the proportional clearance performance by
gender. The productivity of each day is shown as a ratio of the
average cleared area in a day per team. Subsequently, a result of
0.5 indicates that an individual deminer, on that day, at that site,
produced fifty percent of the average output per deminer achieved
by the mixed team on that day. Collation of the 7,575 person-day
results that met the study inclusion criteria resulted in the distribution shown in Figure 3 (see annex). The x axis corresponds to the
normalized performance.9 The y axis represents the frequency of
occurrence of this value as a percentage of the overall dataset of
person-days.
For comparison, Figure 2 shows how the distribution would
look if one group were performing at thirty percent less than the
average deminer and the other at thirty percent above the average.
Country

Gender index11

Women deminers

Men deminers

Total

% Women

Months of data

Year

A

Low

140

187

327

43%

12

2019

B

High

129

202

33

39%

9

2021

C

Very high

36

135

171

21%

5

2021

D

Very high

36

151

187

19%

12

2021

E

Low

20

69

89

22%

12

2021

Table 1. Summary of HR data collected.
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In Figure 1, the central portions of the curve (between 0.75
and 1.25 times the average) results for women are slightly higher
than for men, but a small number of results between 1.25 and 1.5
times average, show a higher figure for men than women. Such
variations are associated with a small number of sites and days
when other external factors, that were not indicated in the records,
may have been influential. Expansion of the analysis to more data
meeting the inclusion criteria would be expected to bring the
curves for both men and women closer to the underlying normal
distribution already evident in Figure 1. There is no general pattern which suggests that operational productivity varies significantly between genders.
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Hypothesised Distribution - where one group is 30% less effective than the average deminer
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Figure 2: Illustrative histogram of the result should one group be thirty percent less effective than the average
deminer. The data for Group A follows a normal distribution with (μ= 0,7, σ = 0.2), for Group B the parameters are
(μ= 1,3, σ = 0.2).
Conclusion
The analysis indicates that within the study parameters there
is no meaningful difference in terms of operational productivity between men and women working in technical survey and

clearance. Both women and men are represented at the upper, most
productive, and lower, least productive ends of the range, with no
meaningful difference in distribution.

Research Question 2: Is there a difference in availability to work
between men and women?
The second research question explores T (the working time variable using HR data). Table 1 represents a summary of the data collected. The table includes the OECD Social Institutions & Gender
Index for each country as contextual information.10 Notably, data
was collected from countries with scores ranging from low to very
high in the index.
Data Analysis
To conduct cross-comparison between country programs, leave
types were grouped into larger categories: compulsory, sick, and
parental leave, while other types were grouped into one remaining
category (“other”). This ensured that only those leave types that
were common across all datasets, such as sick and parental leave,
were compared against each other.
Compulsory leave encompasses annual and compensatory leave
as it is time taken off that is required by operators. Sick leave data
was available in all five datasets. Parental leave data, which includes

maternity and paternity leave, were available in four datasets (A, B,
D, and E). Finally, all other types of leave which did not necessarily
have an equivalent across country programs were grouped into the
remaining “other” category.
The analysis therefore focused on sick, parental, and “other” categories of leave. Three sub-questions were explored in the analysis:
1. What is the average time taken off for sick
leave per deminer by gender?
2. What is the average time taken off for
parental leave per deminer by gender?
3. What is the average time taken off per deminer by
gender when excluding parental and compulsory leave?
Country program C was excluded from the analysis in subquestions two and three as the dataset only contained information on sick leave. Datasets relating to country programs B and C
included data over a period of nine and five months, respectively,
whereas country programs A, D, and E were collected over a period
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of twelve months. To compare them the results displayed in tables
two and four were normalized to reflect the average time taken off
over a period of a year.
Findings
Average time taken off for sick leave. The first subquestion looked at the average sick leave taken by gender. In country
programs B, C, D, and E the annualized difference between men
and women is a few hours. While noting that in country program
A women take two and a half days more sick leave than men over
that year, there is no general pattern across the different countries
that indicates that there is a meaningful difference between men
and women in time taken for sick leave. It is also worth noting that
the total number of days of sick leave taken is generally very low in
comparison to the typical working year of around 220 days.12
Parental leave. The second sub-question looks at the percentage of deminers taking parental—maternity and paternity—leave
per country program. The average time taken off for parental leave
is also calculated.

Country

Average per
women per year

Average per men
per year

Difference
(in days)

A

9.2

6.7

2.5

B

2.9

3.1

-0.2

C

0.4

0.5

-0.2

D

3.9

3.6

0.3

E

4.4

4.5

-0.1

Analysis indicates that in country program A, ninety-six percent
of women did not take maternity leave in the time frame for which
data was collected, similarly that percentage was ninety-two percent for country D, and 100 percent for country E. Among those
women who took maternity leave, an average time of sixty-five days
for country program A and forty-four days for country program D
were taken. Paternity leave was not taken by deminers in country
program A and E. In country program D, five percent of deminers
took paternity leave for an average time of two days.
Overall, the number of deminers who take parental leave is
small. The results indicate that maternity leave is taken by a very
small proportion of women deminers in a year.
Average time taken off. Sub-question three looks at the average time taken off when excluding parental and compulsory leave.
Country program B shows women taking on average one leave day
less than men, while in country program A the opposite is true,
women take on average one day more. In country programs E and
D, the difference is measured in hours rather than days. Overall,
in all four country programs the results indicate that there is no
meaningful difference between men and women in time taken off.
Conclusion
The analysis indicates that there is no meaningful difference in
availability to work between men and women employed in fieldbased roles. In particular, the findings suggest that women and
men take roughly equal sick leave and general leave from work.
These findings also suggest that maternity leave is taken by only a
small proportion of women deminers and paternal leave by a very
small number of deminers and only for short periods.

Table 2. Average time taken off for sick leave.

Staff who took parental
leave per gender (%)

Average days taken for staff
who took parental leave

Country

Women

Men

Women

Men

A

4%

0%

64.7

0

D

8%

5%

44

2.1

E

0%

0%

0

0

Country

Average per
women

Average
per men

Difference
(in days)

A

3.5

2.6

0.9

B

9

10.4

-1.4

D

5.6

5.4

0.2

E

7.7

7.8

-0.1

Table 4. Average time taken off excluding
parental and compulsory leave.

Table 3. Deminers (percentage) who took parental leave
including average time taken off.

Recommendations for Future Research
Gender inequality in the country programs analyzed are
ranked from low to very high, but this difference in contextual reality is not ref lected in the findings. Considering the
difference in gender index scores, it is likely that across the
country programs analyzed, the degree to which women will
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have additional burdens—such as unpaid care and housekeeping
chores—may differ from men. This observation raises several
questions related to women’s experience in the mine action sector which may merit investigation in further research.

Final Remarks
This study explored the relationship between operational efficiency and gender. It did so by looking at the rate at which product
is produced (U) and working time (T). For there to be a difference
in operational efficiency, there would have to be a difference in
either operational productivity or available time to work, or both.
The findings indicate:
• no meaningful difference in operational productivity (U)
based on gender;
• no meaningful difference in availability to work (T)
based on gender.

This suggests that there is no meaningful difference in the operational efficiency of field-based staff on the basis of gender, at least
within the data available to this study.

Annex – Methodology
This annex details the methodology adopted throughout the
study. It outlines how the data was collected and analyzed for each
research question.
Data Collection & Generalizability
A purposive sampling method was used to collect data for the
two research questions, meaning that operators and country programs were deliberately approached.13 This method reflects the
realities of collecting data in the mine action sector whereby it is
necessary to first build a rapport with relevant operators and second to determine what data they collect and what they can share.
Although the findings cannot, in strict statistical terms, be generalized to the whole population of deminers working around the
world, it is reasonable to conclude that on the basis of the wide
breadth of data collected from fourteen country programs and four
distinct operators, the findings are indicative for the entire mine
action sector.
Research Question 1: Data selection Comparing ‘like-for-like’
Like most human endeavors, mine action, especially survey and
clearance, is complicated and often complex.14 Easily defined activities, such as searching ground for EO hazards, take place within a
wider context of interacting physical, economic, social, and professional influences. Defining those influences can often be difficult
and developing mechanisms to describe their interactions is even
more challenging. The mine action sector continues to devote time
and effort to developing common methods for documenting and
analyzing factors such as ground, topography, vegetation, weather,
and security, but effective systems are not yet fully agreed upon or
implemented. Other factors, such as management decision-making, including the influences of prejudices, assumptions, misconceptions, and other perceptions, may also influence the conduct of
survey and clearance by deminers.
The breadth and uncertainty of contextual aspects meant that
any analysis seeking to compare performance between individuals
in different survey and clearance teams, working at different locations, would have suffered from distortion by too many external

factors that could not be normalized. These factors are considered external variables which, if not controlled for, could affect
the measurement of the independent variable, gender. Due to the
nature of clearance, it is difficult to fully control these external
variables, but it is possible to mitigate against them.
In the absence of either enough contextual data, or any agreed
method to normalize performance within such data, the study team
ensured that performance comparisons satisfied “like-for-like”
requirements as much as possible. Comparison between men and
women was conducted for deminers within the same team working on the same task on the same days over an extended period.
Doing so minimized the influences of decision-making managers
and the physical environment by ensuring that any comparisons
were made within a team context that would be subject to the same
group of influences at the site, and on the day, when working data
was recorded. It is recognized that, even on one work site, different clearance lanes can be subject to very different physical factors,
including slope, vegetation, contamination, etc., but by imposing a
minimum number of days of data for each team, the effects of such
factors on individual performance are more likely to even out.
While collecting data, special attention was given to what type
of clearance methodology was used by a deminer on a particular day. In the rare instances where deminers from the same team
were working according to different methods of clearance, only
those values that were from the same clearance methodology were
compared. This ensured that values were compared on a “like-forlike” basis.
Inclusion Criteria for Data Selection
When analyzing issues relating to gender, it is important to take
into consideration societal factors. For instance, a team leader
may treat women and men differently, which could in turn influence their outputs. By selecting teams where women and men are
evenly split (or close to), the study mitigated against some of those
societal factors.
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Percentage Team Composition (%)

An inclusion range was developed to
Team Composition Inclusion Range
100
ensure that the averages calculated were
Male
as representative as possible. Ensuring that
there was a balanced number of women
Female
80
and men in the team analyzed increased
the chances that the results were not
60
explainable by chance alone. This inclusion range was a minimum of thirty percent women or men deminers per team.
40
Any mixed teams with fewer than thirty
percent men or women deminers were
excluded from the analysis. This percent20
age did not include the team leader as they
did not have square meters cleared associ0
ated to their name.
Teams with fewer than twenty values
Male/Female Deminer Team Composition
(person-days) on average per deminer
were also excluded. A value represents the total m 2 cleared in one Figure 3. Inclusion range for composition of mixed teams.
day by one deminer. This inclusion criterion was developed to
ensure that the values collected per deminer were as representa- form of a histogram. The x axis corresponds to the proportional
tive as possible of their “normal” performance. A low number of area cleared (normalized by team). The y axis represents the frevalues are more likely to be susceptible to the effects of external quency of this value as a percentage of the overall dataset (i.e., the
factors such as differences in terrain between deminers or how percentage of the overall dataset of 7,575 person-days).
Figure 2 shows how the distribution would look if one group
the deminer was feeling on that specific day. By including teams
were
performing at thirty percent less than the average deminer
with a minimum average of twenty days per deminer, the likeliand the other at thirty percent above the average. The data for
hood of strong f luctuation decreases.
Operational data from six country programs satisfied the Group A follows a normal distribution with (μ= 0,7, σ = 0.2) and
inclusion criteria. Clearance methodologies included ODOL for Group B the parameters are (μ= 1,3, σ = 0.2).
The performance results for men and women approximate to
with detector, sub-surface BAC and other mixed excavation and
detection approaches. All clearance methods were included in a normal distribution curve in both cases (women: μ= 0.970, σ =
the analysis if it was possible to determine which square meters 0.367; men: μ= 1.028, σ = 0.401). The difference between means (μ)
were cleared by which deminer. Within the data, twenty-three is negligible, indicating that there is no meaningful difference in
teams from six country programs each from different geographi- operational productivity by deminer based on gender.
The analysis draws from 7,575 data points of which 4,135 are
cal regions yielded a total of 7,575 ‘person-day’ values that met
the inclusion criteria. On average, within the data collected, days worked by men and 3,440 by women. The histogram is sepateams were composed of forty-five percent women and data were rated into forty bins of a width of 0.05 and range from zero to
two. Although outliers with values above two are included in the
extracted over an average period of thirty-six days per team.
analysis, these are not displayed in the figure as they do not affect
Data Analysis
the results and are not helpful in visualizing the general pattern
The data was normalized per team to combine the data from which emerges.
all twenty-three teams. Normalization means adjusting the values
measured on different scales to a common proportional scale to be Research Question 2: Data Selection
HR data relating to leave days was collected for all operational/
able to compare their distribution. Each daily value for individuals within a specific team was ratioed to the average value for that technical staff within a country program across a total of five counteam across all data for that team, with the team average equaling tries and spanning over three continents.15 Operational/technical staff included those who were engaged in community liaison
one. To do so the following equation was used:
normalised data=data/( average m2 cleared ).
(CL), explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and survey and
The average output per deminer for each team equates to one. clearance. As opposed to RQ1, HR data was not only collected for
The output values associated with each deminer on that day at deminers but for all field staff, as they are likely to experience simithat site were ratioed against the average output per day to yield a lar influences relating to leave including management practices,
spread of productivity disaggregated by gender. In this way all val- program policies, and societal factors. An added benefit of expandues within the dataset become a ratio of the average performance ing the inclusion criteria to all field-based staff was that larger
per deminer per day for their team. The results are displayed in the datasets could be included in the analysis. Senior management and
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office-based support staff were not included in this analysis, as different leave policies and practices apply to field-based and officebased staff. It was not necessary to look at HR data on a team basis
as the study did not need to mitigate for differences relating to the
type of minefield or task.
The datasets were collected in a way which minimized the impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic on the data. The pandemic, which started
in 2019 and is still ongoing at the time of writing, may have affected
leave days taken by operational staff as they were forced to quarantine if they either contracted the virus, displayed symptoms, or were
in contact with someone who tested positive. Two approaches were
used to minimize the effects of the pandemic on the datasets: (1) talking to country programs to understand in what way the pandemic
had affected their operations and collect data from those years where
they had been least affected, and (2) excluding leave days relating to
COVID-19 when this was possible to do so, i.e., the country program
differentiated leave days taken because of COVID-19 from other
types of leave (including sick leave for other reasons).
Data Analysis
The dataset sample grouped five country programs and
included a total of 1,105 individuals, 361 of which were women.
Availability was measured by calculating the average “unavailable” time for men and women within operational/technical
staff per country program.
availability to work=(total time off)/(number of deminers).

Categories of leave across operators and country programs
were not necessarily equivalent or measured in the same way.
Some datasets were more detailed, with eight categories of leave
specified including COVID-19 and accident leave, while others
only included sick leave. Although categories may have a similar
heading, it is not guaranteed that the definition of that category is
identical in all country programs. For instance, several operators
record compassionate leave, but this may be measured differently
in various country programs.
To conduct cross-comparison between country programs, leave
types were grouped into larger categories: compulsory, sick, and
parental leave, while other types were grouped into one remaining
category (“other”). This ensured that only those leave types that
were common across all datasets such as sick leave and parental
leave were compared against each other.
Compulsory leave encompasses annual and compensatory leave
as it is time taken off that is required by operators. Sick leave data
was available in all five datasets. Parental leave data, which includes
maternity and paternity leave, were available in four datasets (A, B,
D, and E). Finally, all other types of leave, which did not necessarily
have an equivalent across country programs, were grouped into the
remaining “other” category.
The analysis therefore focused on sick, parental, and “other” categories of leave.
See endnotes page 108
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WORLD WAR II
IN ALASKA
By Ken Rutherford, PhD
[ Professor of Political Science, James Madison University ]

St. Paul

Attu
Cold Bay
Kiska

Japanese Occupation of the Aleutian Islands

I

n the middle of the Bering Sea—closer to Japan than the continental United States and more than 1,000 miles from Alaska’s
largest city, Anchorage—sit the Alaskan islands of Attu and
Kiska. It was the summer of 1942, nearly six months after Japan’s
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, that Japanese forces invaded these
islands in what was some of World War II’s most brutal fighting
and use of explosives.
The Japanese military high command had decided to occupy
Attu and Kiska to fulfill several goals:
• To prevent American use of the Alaskan archipelago for
mounting offensive operations (Attu is only 720 miles from
Japan’s Northern Territories islands)1
• To drive a wedge between US and Soviet insular possessions
• To establish bases for air operations against Alaska and the
west coasts of Canada and the United States.
When Japanese forces occupied Attu and Kiska, it was the first
time since the War of 1812 that American soil had been held by foreign forces. The islands are in the far western part of the Aleutian
Islands chain. Most Americans were not aware of the Aleutians
until the Japanese invasion, but the chain of islands was considered a valuable strategic piece of real estate by both Japanese and
American leaders. One year later, Allied forces retook the islands
in bloody fighting that resulted in a deadly legacy of thousands of
explosive remnants of war (ERW), unexploded ordnance (UXO),
landmines, and booby traps, some of which may still infest the soil.
The major obstacle for both armies was the Aleutians’ isolated
geography, characterized by difficult weather. Among all World
War II battlefields, the Aleutian Islands were some of the wildest
and most inhospitable. Terrific winds blow at more than 100 miles
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per hour, perpetual fog hinders vision and orientation, and there
are almost no trees on the islands. The temperature drops below
freezing in winter and seldom exceeds sixty degrees in summer,
and the islands have as many as 250 rainy days a year.
Over the fourteen-month occupation, an estimated 8,600
Japanese troops were deployed to Attu and Kiska, which they
heavily fortified in anticipation of inevitable American offensive
operations to recapture the islands. The Japanese prediction was
correct: in responding to the invasion, the US military underwent
the first mass airlift in its history. Within thirty-six hours of the
islands’ occupation, 2,300 American troops and tons of supplies
and weapons were flown to Nome, on the western edge of the
Alaska mainland.
Buildup of the US Army’s forces in Alaska continued until 94,000
troops were stationed across thirteen newly-constructed bases,
including Cold Bay at the western end of the Alaska Peninsula. Due
to US testing and stockpiling of weapons on Cold Bay, humanitarian threats from UXO became an issue.2 One former Cold Bay
inhabitant remembers that “[p]eople were always whizzing around
on three-wheelers, and kids could test their luck screwing around
with the buried World War II munitions that still dot the landscape.” Additionally, children were remembered as “playing on
actual World War II-era torpedoes abandoned on the beach.”3
North of Cold Bay and the Aleutian Islands sits the Pribilof
Islands group, which is where the US Army built a long-range
aid to navigation (LORAN) station, controlling the Bering Sea
approaches to the Alaskan coast. Stationed on the island of Saint
Paul, US soldiers placed landmines around the village buildings on
the chance that the Japanese would invade.4

The impact of WWII in the Aleutian
Islands remains one of the most
visible features that dot this remote
landscape today. WWII concrete
bunker, Dutch Harbor, Alaska.
Image courtesy of the author.

A six-inch projectile
in the emplacement
of a six-inch coastal
defense battery on
Little Kiska (Gun C).
Image courtesy of the
author/Museum of
the Aleutians.

Possibly unexploded shell
largely buried in the sift soil.
Seen northwest of Gun A,
six-inch gun battery, North Head.
Image courtesy of the author/
Museum of the Aleutians.

ATTU: Operation Landgrab
Attu is about forty miles long and twenty miles wide, and its
highest peak rises more than 3,000 feet above the sea. On 11 May
1943, Attu would be the US Army’s first island amphibious landing of the war.5 The soldiers landed in dense fog and were unopposed. Sergeant Hamlin of the 7th Scout Company recalled how
“It was easy to get completely lost in the fog. It was easy to get completely turned around in the thick moving mist that made everything vague … the freezing cold and fog had been a harder enemy
to fight than the Jap[anese]. Ninety percent of the Scout Company
and three-fourths of the 7th Reconnaissance Troop suffered from
severe exposure.”6
From the beginning, Japanese troops were on the defensive and
made the most of the terrain for that purpose. Rather than organizing beach defenses, they chose to defend the high ground at the
northern end of Massacre Bay at 3,000 to 4,000 yards inland, and
in the valleys leading to Chichagof Harbor, where the Japanese had
established a strong defensive position.7 In general, the Japanese
forces employed the same tactics they had used in the South Pacific.
While Attu and Kiska lacked the foliage and tropical growth provided by the islands in the South Pacific, the Japanese prepared
excellent camouflaged positions and dotted the terrain with foxholes and two-man caves protected by light machine guns, mortar
positions, and emplaced landmines.

On the morning of 29 May 1943, nineteen days after American
troops landed, the Japanese staged a massive “Banzai” charge with
around 800 Japanese soldiers attacking the American lines. Before
the charge, nearly 500 Japanese wounded soldiers committed suicide or were killed by their own troops rather than being allowed
to surrender.8 The Japanese inflicted heavy casualties as they overran the frontline American positions, but most were quickly killed
by the American troops.9 By the following morning, the battle for
Attu was over. The American victory in Attu was bloody and costly:
“549 Americans were killed, and more than 3,200 were wounded or
suffered from exposure or other battle injuries. Of the approximate
2,600 Japanese troops on the island, only 28 were taken prisoner.
All others had honored the Samurai code of death.”10
The Battle of Attu ranks as the second deadliest battle in the
Pacific Theater (in proportion to the number of troops engaged),
closely falling behind Iwo Jima. The casualties incurred during the
invasion of Attu were appalling, with Americans suffering 3,248
casualties, roughly 25 percent of the invading force. Of these, 541
men were killed. Of the Japanese forces, 2,350 men were counted
by American burial parties, and hundreds more were presumed
already buried. The Japanese fought to virtually the last man.11

ISSUE 26.1 and 26.2 @ FALL 2022

77

Image courtesy of Alaska
Veterans Museum.

KISKA: Operation Cottage
After the bloody repatriation of Attu, the US Army turned its
sights 205 miles east to the island of Kiska. Approximately thirty
miles long and seven miles wide, the island has a shoreline that
includes few beaches suitable for landing, and the better of the
available beaches were controlled by entrenched Japanese defensive
positions. The Japanese defenders augmented the island’s favorable
defensive geographical features—steep, hilly terrain and a profusion of valleys and caves—with machine gun positions, newly constructed tunnels and roads, and landmines.
In retaking the island, US forces subjected Kiska to a heavy preinvasion bombardment. The first bombing attacks were carried out
11 June 1943 by four B-24s out of Cold Bay.12 A total of 424 tons of
bombs were dropped on Kiska in July. During the same month, a
strong naval task force lobbed 330 tons of shells onto the island.13
“The surrounded Japanese garrison found a small window of
opportunity in the Allies’ seamless ring of ships to quickly and
quietly evacuate the island in a dense fog. On 28 July, the Japanese
garrison evacuated 5,200 Japanese soldiers on nineteen boats that
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formed the rescue armada. The evacuation was completed in just
fifty-five minutes. Nothing much was left behind except a few
dogs, a corpse of a soldier who had died recently of natural causes,
a litter of landmines and booby traps, and some bombs preset to
blow at the rate of one a day.14 An after action report by US Army
Intelligence noted that the south end of Kiska was found to be
sprinkled liberally with mines and booby-traps. One of the favorite
methods was to wire an M-93 mine upside down to about thirty
blocks of TNT, thus increasing the concussion area.”15
Canadian artillery officer Captain William Kirby, who was part
of the Kiska recapture, shared how the enemy’s ability to slip away
“through the ‘impenetrable’ Allied naval blockade, which was really
a triple blockade of seaplanes, submarines and coastal torpedo boats
escorted by destroyers, had been a daring and brilliant feat.”
Additionally, the Kiska evacuation had been carried out almost
three weeks before the planned Allied landing. Since the Japanese
departure went undetected, US forces continued to bomb and shell
the abandoned island. In the ensuing month, more than 2,700 tons

Former classified Kiska Map - Pre-Allied invasion of
Japanese occupied Kiska Island. "War Department, Corps of
Engineers, US Army," July 1943. One of the few if not only
map of landmines emplaced on US soil by a foreign Army.
The US Army suffered landmine casualties on the island.
Image courtesy of the author/Museum of the Aleutians archives.

of bombs were dropped on the deserted island, including “two of
the navy’s bombardments that were the heaviest in Pacific naval
warfare.”17 More than 300 tons of explosives were dropped in a
single day alone: 4 August 1943.
Kiska D-Day, 15 August, was a typical Aleutian day. Dense
fog covered the island, accompanied by high winds and a cold,
heavy rain. Despite the weather conditions, almost 35,000 US and
Canadian soldiers poured ashore. One Allied leader predicted that
recapturing Kiska would be “bitter fighting with a Japanese force of
from six to ten thousand” and that their goal was “to take as many
prisoners as possible and … put a wedge into their Samurai code.”19
Heavy casualties were also expected based on American soldiers’
recent experience at Attu. For every 100 Japanese killed on Attu,
seventy-one American soldiers were killed or injured. The estimated casualty rate expected for Allied soldiers at Kiska was 90
percent.20 Information gathered by the Alaska Defense Command
and the Advanced Intelligence Center, North Pacific Area, showed
that “the Japanese development of Kiska was much more extensive

than the development of Attu. Almost all beaches possessed some
defenses, including barbed wire and mines.”21
Allied commanders refuzed to believe that the Japanese could
have completely evacuated Kiska.22 For days, American and
Canadian troops searched the island that they thought was still
under the control of Japanese forces. The only living creatures the
American and Canadian soldiers found were a few stray Japanese
dogs. “We dropped 100,000 propaganda leaflets on Kiska, one airman said, “but those dogs couldn’t read.”23
Eventually more than 300 casualties would be recorded on
Kiska. Some men were killed by friendly fire when confused and
scared soldiers accidentally shot their comrades in fog-laden gunfights.24 Others were killed or injured by landmines and the timed
bombs the Japanese left behind.25 Warnings were sent out not to
pick up any Japanese candles as they were booby traps left behind.26
On 24 August 1943, The New York Times asserted, “2 KILLED AT
KISKA; Land Mines and Booby Traps Encountered in Landing.”27
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Deadly Legacy
While Attu is the only battle fought on
American soil in World War II, its deadly
legacy of conventional weapons contamination continues. In the three-week battle,
more than 3,000 tons of ordnance were
deployed. Currently, the most dangerous
ordnance on Attu are the buster shells,
which is a type of munition designed to penetrate Japanese targets buried deep underground, such as military bunkers. Live shells
were found in the ammunition dump, and
the island is off-limits to personnel without
proper clearance.28
In 2013, the US Fish and Wildlife Service
concluded that the threat of UXO and ERW

Warning sign at Kiska.
Image courtesy of the author.

from the fighting and occupation by both Japanese and Allied
forces during World War II remains an issue on both Attu and
Kiska. Despite the islands being designated as national wildlife
refuges reserved for the conservation of wildlife and fish, UXO
and ERW remain safety hazards. In particular, “[a]s the years
progress, erosion exposes new sites while others are overgrown
by vegetation.” 29
As of 2016, “there are fears of unexploded munitions that haven’t
either been discovered and removed, or otherwise disabled that perhaps in part drives these cautionary measures.”30 Few individuals
visit Attu because the National Park Service has placed the island
under restrictions.31 Previous US government-funded UXO and
ERW investigations for Attu have found a 100-pound Army practice bombs; smoke pots; smoke generators; smoke grenades; flares;
fuzes; barrage rockets; 250- and 500-pound projectiles; incendiary bombs and bomblets; 6-, 10-, 12-, and 14-inch projectiles; small
arms ammunition up to .50-caliber; high-explosive anti-tank and
high-explosive incendiary rounds; fragmentation bombs; 20-mm
(high-explosive) and 40-mm warheads; and anti-personnel mines.
An Army Corps of Engineers report concluded that “[o]rdnance
and explosive waste was estimated in tons, with some concentrated
and with significant amounts scattered throughout the island hidden by the dense vegetation.”32 At last count, twenty-five warning
signs were posted around known UXO and ERW areas on Attu.33
Kiska is now recognized as a National Historic Landmark and is
part of the World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument.

An American landmine detector used in the
Aleutian Islands.
Image courtesy of the author/Museum of the Aleutians.
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WWII National Historic area, Dutch Harbor, Aleutian
Islands, Alaska. During WWII, this isolated mountaintop
(US Army Fort Schwatka, Mt. Ballyhoo) fortification was
home to 1,000 US servicemen. Their duty was to protect
Dutch Harbor from Japanese seaborne attacks.
Image courtesy of the author.

Kiska is the only battlefield in the United States, and is only one
of three battlefields worldwide, where there was no substantial
human presence before the battle and where no subsequent alterations to the landscape have occurred.34
During the fourteen-month Aleutian Islands campaign to recapture Kiska, 3,000 tons of bombs rained down on the island, while
the Japanese defenders mined and booby trapped their positions.35
Because of the intensive bombing efforts and the large quantities of
abandoned ordnance left behind by the Japanese, large quantities
of UXO and ERW remain on Kiska, 36 where the traces of the battle
are preserved in place and unchanged.
Because the full extent of UXO and ERW contamination is unknown and not all areas of Attu and Kiska have been

investigated, the potential exists for such contamination to be
present anywhere on these islands. Posted signs read “Warning!
Kiska is a World War II battlefield. Unexploded ammunition is
scattered throughout the landscape!”37
See endnotes page 108
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HOW CAN MINE ACTION IMPROVE
THE MANAGEMENT OF FREE
FROM EXPLOSIVE (FFE) ITEMS?
By Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

A

ssessing and making items free from explosive (FFE) are among the most dangerous things
we do in mine action and are perhaps the least regulated. Mine action operators use items
that have been made FFE or INERT for training and demonstration purposes. However, the
sector does not really have sufficient procedures or qualifications to assess items as certified free
from explosive (CFFE), or to make items FFE/INERT. Assessing or making items FFE are explosive
processes and should be treated as such more consistently within the mine action sector. This
article will outline the current state of play concerning FFE items in mine action, some of the problems involved, and suggest some potential options for consideration.

The Requirement for FFE Items
The humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector uses items of
explosive ordnance (EO) that are CFFE, or INERT1 for a range
of reasons (INERT and FFE are interchangeable terms with the
same essential meaning). Foremost among these is the need to
provide items for training, not only to show students what different categories, sub-categories, and models of EO2 look like, but
also to provide items for realistic field exercises. 3 For example,
training deminers to find a specific type of mine will typically
involve some form of INERT substitute target. An anti-personnel
(AP) or anti-vehicle mine is made FFE, but as many metal components as practicable are retained.4 In this way, the item keeps the
electromagnetic signature of the mine for detection purposes but
does not pose an explosive hazard to the trainee. Substitute targets are also used throughout the day on demining sites by trained
deminers in order to calibrate and re-calibrate their detectors as
required. 5 Given that manual demining requires thousands of
staff to be trained and re-trained without immediate risk, and
that each demining site needs a substitute target for its test pit,6
the need for inert targets for demining operations is arguably substantial. While inerting items involves an “inherent risk,” 7 it could
be claimed that not inerting items and therefore not having targets
with a high degree of fidelity also poses a risk to deminers. Without
such high-fidelity substitute targets, deminers might be at greater
risk of missing mines. Sometimes deminers will neutralize, disarm, and then inert the first landmines found on a survey or clearance task and use these as test targets for calibrating detectors.
The logic behind this is that the mine will have weathered in a way
consistent with other mines on that particular site and therefore
provides a more faithful representation of what deminers need to
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detect with their Electro-Magnetic Induction equipment.8
(Specific test pieces are manufactured but they don't have
the ageing characteristics of items found on site.) FFE
items may also be required for research, such as the evaluation of new sensors for mine detection.9,10 While there have
been efforts to develop surrogates for use in lieu of FFE
items for research purposes,11-13 testing in field locations
still invariably uses items immediately available, such as
FFE mines, rather than surrogates that might need to be
imported at significant expense.
FFE items are also needed to train HMA explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) staff, not just for recognition
purposes, but also for simulated task scenarios. Such
needs mirror those of military EOD units. In the United
States, the Department of Defense requires Secretaries of
Military Departments to “provide sufficient quantities of
inert and live EO items for EOD procedures joint validation and test verification and EOD training.”14 While
surrogates made by means of 3D printing are available,15
they can be expensive and may be deliberately made to be

Figure 1. An INERT LU 211 BB 155mm projectile.
Note the clear INERT marking on the ogive.
Rigorous marking of FFE items is essential. Some
items in the sector are simply inadequately
marked with an indelible permanent marker pen.
Image courtesy of Danish EOD and Search Center.

visually distinguishable from real versions that have been made
FFE. Other uses of FFE items are perhaps less essential and include
displays of items made FFE at various mine action organizations.

Such displays may have many purposes, including as a form of
exhibit to brief visitors while doubling as a training resource. FFE
items are also used for museum displays.16

Current Risk Management of FFE in Mine Action
There are a range of documents detailing how FFE items should
be made and certified. The documents reflect the different contexts of mine action and ammunition storage and are therefore
not necessarily consistent. The current mine action guidelines on making and assessing items as FFE in mine action
are detailed in International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)
10.50, “Storage, Transportation and Handling of Explosives.”17
While not a normative reference of IMAS 10.50, International
Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 06.50, “Specific
Safety Precautions (Storage and Operations),” also has pertinent detail.18 Notably, Annex F of IMAS 10.50 details some
requirements concerning the “breakdown or modification
of live mines and ammunition into inert, drill, instructional or replica items,” whilst IATGs only give guidance
on certifying those items as FFE.19 Breakdown of ammunition is detailed in IATG 07.30, “Ammunition Processing
Operations,” but not really in the context of inerting items
in order to certify them as FFE.20 This is consistent with the
old UK Joint Service Publication 482 on which much IATG
content is based.21 It might also be said that this reflects the
different needs of each respective sector. Some may argue
that mine action needs to conduct inerting procedures in
a way that is not necessary for routine ammunition storage. What is clear is that a sector that conducts inerting is
carrying significant levels of risk and accordingly should
have a high level of risk management practice as a norm.
Does mine action have sufficiently developed risk management procedures for making items FFE, let alone certifying items? It is not clear that it does. One significant
omission from IMAS 10.50 Annex F is the lack of any form
of risk assessment requirement prior to making an item
FFE. Perhaps remarkably, the whole of the current IMAS
10.50 does not include the term “risk assessment” at all.
IATGs do require a risk assessment prior to any explosive
process, including CFFE.
While IMAS 10.50 emphasizes the need for authorization procedures, Annex F often uses the word “must”
rather than “shall” when detailing requirements, which
in the IMAS entails a degree of ambiguity. These requirements include the need for full technical documentation
and the need for authority from the National Mine Action
Centre to conduct a procedure. IMAS also states that “all
authorised breakdown or modification of live mines and
ammunition into inert, drill, instructional or replica items
shall only be carried out by appropriately qualified and
authorised personnel.”22 Which personnel in mine action

are “appropriately qualified and authorized” to make items FFE, let
alone certify items? It is not clear whether there is actually a specific
qualification to inert items. The US Marines are often seen as leading on inerting undamaged and unfired EO. While they have an
exploitation course, it is not a requirement for inerting. It tends to
be done by those with the highest levels of skill and experience.23–25
IMAS 10.50 does add that only EOD Level 3+ personnel conduct
demilitarization. However, at the time when the third edition of
IMAS 10.50 was written in 2013, the EOD competencies did not
mention demilitarization or FFE at all.
The new Test and Evaluation Protocol (T&EP) 09.30,
“Conventional EOD Competency Standards,” 26 tried to provide more detail on the knowledge and skills required to at
least assess items as FFE. A new EOD 3+ module, Advanced
Explosive Theory, listed thirty-one competencies for assessing
items. Emphasis was placed on understanding in detail all energetic elements within an item of EO. Other skills listed included
use of X-ray, development and maintenance of FFE register, and
drafting of specific risk assessments for assessment and certification of FFE items. Unlike IMAS 10.50, the competencies covered
FFE assessment only, not any form of inerting or making items
FFE. At present there are no competencies that cover inerting or
demilitarization even though these are activities that do occur in
the sector. During the development of revised 2022 T&EP 09.30,
the possibility of a specific EOD 3+ module covering demilitarization competencies was raised but was ultimately rejected. If
such a module had been developed it would have been suitable
only for the most advanced EOD technicians and would have
involved technical training well beyond any other 3+ module.
A 3+ demilitarization module would last many months, rather
than just a few weeks, require strict pre-requisites for candidates,
and necessitate specialized ammunition processing facilities.
Certain commercial organizations do have detailed risk management processes for demilitarization. Fenix Insight conduct
demilitarization of a range of ordnance, notably cluster munitions and explosive submunitions, in order to assist countries to
meet their Article 3 obligations under the Convention on Cluster
Munitions.27 The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Golden
West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF) runs a demilitarization site in Cambodia where EO, once disarmed, is harvested for
explosives that are then used for donor charges for demining activities.28–31 The risk management systems for explosive processing
for both organizations are stringent. Each process, clearly documented, is subject to formal internal approval. Managers actively
identify, manage, and own risk.
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FFE in the British Military
In the United Kingdom, military “CFFE is to be treated as
an explosives process,”32 which implicitly requires a number of
safety and risk management precautions to be observed. “Any
task involving the manufacture, assembly, repair, testing, modification, or disassembly of explosives carries with it an increased
risk of accidental initiation. It is therefore to be regarded as explosives processing and is to be carried out in a facility suitable for
explosives processing.”33 In accordance with Army Command
Standing Order 1200, 34 the “implementation of Safe Systems of
Work (SSOW)” is an overall framework that describes the main
elements of a safety implementation when conducting an explosive process, including FFE. The key elements are competent staff,
adequate supervision, suitable written work instructions, appropriate work equipment, and adequate work facilities.35 The form an
SSOW takes is guided by a risk assessment that considers training
needs.36 This is sometimes referred to in shorthand as “safe place,
safe people and safe procedures.” Notably “staff must have appropriate written authorization indicating their competency to carry
out particular tasks.”37 The process would need to be detailed by
work instructions38 authorized by someone not below the rank of
Major or equivalent, with an intimate knowledge of the process,
who is themselves authorized by someone not below the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent.39 Personnel authorized to certify
FFE are published on Unit Standing Orders, adding to transparency.40 Another means of controlling the process is the implementation of a Permit to Work system.41 Mine action does not have an
equivalent.42,43 Above all these requirements, the key document on
the subject, Defence Safety Agency 03. Ordnance Munitions and
Explosives only details certifying items FFE. It does not describe
the requirements for actually inerting items. This is because typically the process of inerting would not be done by military personal

at all, but by specialists at the Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory who possess the remote equipment required for this
form of explosive processing. It is notable that an equivalent overarching framework for conducting FFE is not
replicated in HMA.44
Figures 2 and 3. A 3D printed
replica PMA-2 anti-personnel mine.
The INERT item has been
developed for training
deminers by the Swiss
EOD Center. The training
aid has been designed to
assist detection training,
with with ability to change
the metal content in the
small red container. While
not necessarily a perfect
match for items that have
weathered over time, and not an
option for test pieces, such items are an
option for training deminers.
Figures courtesy of the author.

Should Mine Action Even Be Making Items FFE?
It could be argued that making items FFE should largely stop
within the mine action sector. There are already many items that
are claimed as FFE by many organizations, and these can be
supplemented by inert training aids that can be produced relatively
easily by means of 3D printing. If making items FFE entails a “high
degree of inherent risk,” does the risk-reward calculation make
sense anymore? After all, military organizations such as the British
Army only inert items if it is strictly necessary. The question is at
least worth asking within HMA.
Some will argue that it is justifiable to continue to inert items,
not least since in certain circumstances we will continue to neutralize and disarm items of EO regardless. For some simple AP
mines, the process of neutralization and disarming is a significant part of the inerting process anyway. At least for minefield
clearance, no longer inerting items could mean not having high
fidelity test pieces that reduce the risk of missed mines and also
more destruction of mines in situ, potentially leading to more
84
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metal contamination and false positive signals
during clearance, as well as more risk in a different sense.
In some ways inerting items of EO poses a dilemma for the
mine action sector. On the one hand, the ammunition management sector sees making items FFE as a last resort, and when it is
done, it must be justified by managers, and extensive levels of risk
management are required. The mine action sector, used to removing explosives from items such as simple AP mines in order to
make test pieces over many years, has not treated this as an explosive process but sometimes as a relatively routine field practice.
Whether mine action should strictly mirror ammunition management and apply the same level of rigor is up to those who lead the
sector. However, it is clear that when both certifying and inerting
items, the mine action sector should review its norms and consider
whether its procedures reduce risk to a level “as low as reasonably
practicable” (ALARP).

Figure 4. Mechanical Remote
Fuze Disassembly Kit used
for removing small energetic
components such as primers
in fuze rotors, GWHF
Cambodia 2014. If mine action
organizations wish to make
items of explosive ordnance
INERT, and to train suitable
staff to do so, specialist
explosive processing facilities
are required.
Image courtesy of Roger Hess.

Possible FFE Risk Management Options to Consider
Designing a detailed and heavy risk management system for
inerting and certifying FFE is an option, but any proposed system needs acceptance by the sector. The answer could be to revise
the risk management system so that it is rigorous but does not

overburden HMA field operators and recognizes the context of
HMA demining operations. Calibrating such a system appropriately will be an important part in its success or failure. Some
options to consider could include:

All organizations maintaining a central record of all items they have certified FFE globally, respectively
An approved, model-specific, energetic component check list for certifying each item of FFE held
FFE certificates listing the exact energetic components removed with date, time, and individual who
conducted the procedure recorded, along with detail of the permanent FFE marking
A surveillance regime for all accidents related to FFE
Development by each mine action organization of an overall standard operating procedure (SOP) for
assessing items as FFE
If the organization wishes to make items INERT, a list of approved technical procedures needs to be
developed for each model to be made FFE. Each procedure could have two technical approvals, one of
which could be independent of the organization
If the organization wishes to make items INERT, an FFE training record that details each specific model
an individual is authorized to make or certify as FFE that is time limited
A risk assessment specific to the model of EO, primarily applicable to making items FFE but also
relevant to certification
For making an item FFE, a Permission to Work form to be completed by an authorized senior technician
that confirms that a SSOW is in place for an explosive process to take place
If an organization wishes to make items INERT, development of advanced demilitarization training.
While these options might seem basic, if just CFFE options
were implemented in mine action, the risk of FFE-related incidents could be reduced. Even something as simple as the widespread development of SOPs for assessing items as FFE would be a

significant step forward. For organizations that wish to make items
FFE, a full review of how this can be achieved while managing risk
responsibly could be advisable.
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Figure 5 (left). An INERT MRV-U fuze complete. Note that the
fuze appearance has been altered in order to make the item
FFE. A full cut has been made above the shutter in order to
gain access to the primers, stemming, and other energetic
components. For some models, cuts on fuze bodies can
be good initial indicators as to whether energetics have
been removed and the item really is FFE. A window to
view the setback sleeve has also been added during the
inerting process. Making such an item FFE is an explosive
process that should be conducted with a high level of risk
management.
Figure courtesy of Dutch EOD Center.

Figure 6 (right). A cutaway of an FFE MRV-U fuze. The pink and
yellow elements visible in the booster section are not explosive
but an inert substitute intended to indicate the position of
some energetic elements within the fuze.
Figure courtesy of Dutch EOD Center.

FFE Risk Assessments
If organizations wish to make items INERT, pertinent written
risk assessments are an essential element of any risk management
system. The key principle for an FFE risk assessment is that it must
be specific, not generic, in that it must refer to each exact energetic
component contained within an item of EO. The risk assessment
will also detail a control measure or risk treatment for that component. That control measure will often be the same as the specific
part of the authorized process to remove that component, but the

documents are not necessarily the same. The risk assessment would
complement the inerting process but would not be a substitute for it.
It is notable that even for a relatively simple AP mine, the risk
assessment is fairly detailed. More complex items of EO will
invariably require a more detailed risk assessment, consistent
with the number of energetic components they contain, and formally approved procedures required to access and remove those
components.

FFE Procedure
The development of a technical procedure is an indispensable
element of any FFE process, both for making and certifying an item
as FFE. The procedure must not only identify each energetic component, but how it will be removed safely. NGOs such as GWHF
have developed such procedure documents.45,46 It should also be
sufficiently illustrated with technical photographs so that there is
no ambiguity as to the information it is trying to convey. The procedure complements a risk assessment for a specific item, but it is

not a substitute for one. HMA organizations should be careful that
the procedure is only ever carried out by those proven competent
to do so. A reasonable test for such competency, even for those with
advanced EOD qualifications, would be for the EOD technician to
rehearse how the procedure will be conducted without reference to
the procedure document, in order to confirm understanding, prior
to a Permission to Work being granted.

Environmental Considerations
Removal of energetics, particularly main charges, can lead to
chemical waste such as wastewater contaminated by TNT through
the process of wash out and steam out,47 or by means of hydroabrasive cutting.48,49 Mine action has only recently started to appreciate the specific pollution risks associated with EO.50,51 Especially
if large items with significant volumes of explosive fill are to be
made FFE, the risk assessment should include how any specific
environmental impact will be controlled. Various energetics have
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differing levels of toxicity. For example, Tetryl has been phased
out since the 1970s due to health effects experienced by exposed
munitions workers since the 1940s.52–54 It is still commonly found
in legacy munitions. Chronic exposure to both RDX and TNT is
known to present a degree of risk.55–57 Any inerting risk assessment
should consider the potential health effects that repeated exposure
to a given energetic could entail and identify the standard controls,
such as use of basic personal protective equipment.

FFE Records
HMA organizations should maintain a detailed record of all
FFE items they have globally. Keeping records solely at a given
location is insufficient. Such a detailed register must be more
than a list of FFE certificates with accompanying FFE codes. It
should detail when the item was originally made FFE, when it
was certified, when it was last checked, when it must be checked
again, and who has conducted all these procedures. Individual
FFE certificates should also list the energetic components
removed from an item. If an X-ray image was used to confirm

the absence of energetics within an enclosed item (e.g., a fuze),
the X-ray image should be included on the certificate, annotated
to show where components are confirmed as absent. In this way
instances of “assumed FFE,” such as fuzes that have been burnt,
can be avoided. The record must identify where the marking of
the item is positioned and whether the marking is engraved (recommended) or just indelibly marked. The security of the item
should also be detailed (i.e., is the item locked away so that it
cannot be mixed inadvertently with live ordnance).
Figure 7. An X-ray of an ADSID sensor. X-rays were
taken of the ADSID using a SAIC RTR-4 with the
XRS-3 X-ray source; 10 pulses at 25cm for all X-rays.
No detonation cord, booster, or main charge was
detected in the body. X-rays are an important means
of discovering whether items still contain energetic
components, prior to certifying them FFE.
Figure courtesy of GWHF.

Figure 8. An X-ray of a heat warhead. X-rays are an
important means of discovering whether items still contain energetic components, prior to certifying them FFE.
Figure courtesy of private individual.

Conclusion
Making and certifying items FFE are relatively unregulated
activities in HMA. It might well prove that a more stringent system
than the one briefly sketched here will be required at some point in
the future. In any case, what is outlined in this article would be a
significant increase in the current level of risk management process
for FFE in mine action and can at least serve as a starting point for
a long overdue discussion within the sector. Regardless of whether
a new way of making and certifying items as FFE is adopted, the

approach outlined in various documents concerning FFE, including IMAS 10.50, IATG 06.10, and T&EP 09.30, requires rationalization, so that at least a consistent approach can be adopted. In
addition to this, each mine action operator may wish to review
their FFE SOPs to ensure they are content with the levels of risk
management detailed. Ultimately, each mine action organization
should not only be able to identify and manage risk but actively
own the risks they choose to take.
See endnotes page 109
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F

or over a decade, the widespread use of explosive
weapons by all sides in the Syrian conflict has been
well documented by a litany of public sources. Many
of these explosive munitions fail to detonate as intended,
thereby becoming unexploded ordnance (UXO) that
threaten post-conflict recovery. To begin the process of
clearing these explosive remnants of war (ERW), desk
studies/non-technical studies can be utilized to initially assess the concentration and distribution of
explosive weapons across a conflict zone, which in
turn suggest the risk of UXO in an area. Traditional
methods in non-technical surveys (NTS) focus on
unweighted conflict intensity scores (counting
the number of events) or after-the-fact munition
detonations to determine current contamination.1
The authors propose a novel, nuanced approach
to counting the number of munitions per event,
not just the number of events. This new opensource weighted estimate (OSWE) method contains higher-fidelity data for analysis with more
specific coverage across a larger geographic area
than prior models. Using crucial and corroborated
open-source investigation workflows, the authors
created a nationwide assessment paradigm. In
comparison with older models, we anticipate that
the OSWE method of estimating UXO concentration is more useful across a greater range of geographic scopes through its leverage of big data,
weighted nature, and data selection for events
likely to generate UXO. The OSWE method also
produces an estimate for UXO in Syria (a minimum
of 100,000 nationwide). These are important findings, as more accurate estimates can be replicated across contexts, including in Ukraine.
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Destroyed buildings in Homs, Syria.
Photo courtesy of Adobe Stockphotos.

Introduction
Although media attention has waned, the Syrian conflict continues, albeit on a smaller scale.2 A nationwide cease-fire announced
in March 2020 has largely held, leading to minimal exchange of
territory among the major warring factions. Despite relatively constant areas of control, the use of explosive weapons and the detonation of UXO is a weekly occurrence. These detonations happen
across the country regardless of which faction controls territories
and often at the cost of civilian life and limb.
In Syria, clearance of explosive contaminants is disrupted by a
slew of variables, namely instabilities in project funding, a volatile
security environment, a prohibitive sanctions regime, uncooperative local partners, and security access challenges of remote contamination assessment. Despite these complicating variables, this
paper will specifically focus on the initial stages of the explosive
ordnance (EO) clearance process by using open-source data on the
conflict in Syria to enhance an NTS. This approach is intended to
assist in the prioritization of key areas.
In 2011, many Syrian civilians took to the streets, calling for
reform as part of a popular national protest inspired by other
mass mobilizations collectively described as the Arab Uprisings.

An ensuing security crackdown on peaceful protesters prompted
the protest movement to call for the overthrow of the Syrian government led by President Bashar al-Assad.3 Further crackdowns
led to defections from the armed forces of Syria, and armed demonstrators shooting back at military forces sent to quell riots. This
cycle escalated into open conflict, occurring for over a decade with
four major territory-holding factions vying for control. Two dozen
more international armed forces have also engaged in Syria, mostly
through airstrikes and artillery strikes.
Syria has had stable frontlines since the spring of 2020, when a
cease-fire was brokered between the government of Syria and the
Turkish-backed opposition in Syria’s northwest. While no new
major offensive has occurred since then—itself a mark of the ceasefire’s conflict resolution success—the term “cease-fire” is a misnomer, as indirect conflict and occasional clashes are still reported
daily in Syria. Syria’s northwest region, where frontlines between
the opposition and the government meet, averages at least 350
conflict events per month as recorded by the Armed Conflict and
Location Event Database (ACLED).

Literature Review
Since World War II, UXO have traditionally been detected
on the ground by clearance teams who detect potential hazards,
excavate, and determine if the object is a UXO.4 The prevailing
approaches used in humanitarian mine action (HMA) employ
either magnetometers or terrestrial electromagnetic induction
(EMI) systems. 5 Although these have been validated as one of the
most dependable geophysical methods for HMA, they have several weaknesses, including high false-positive rates in areas with
metallic clutter,6 time and labor intensiveness,7 and operator vulnerability.8 These factors, along with operator experience and the
technological capability of mine-detection technology, impact the
rate of mine clearance.9
Newer approaches conduct automated surveying by remote
sensing via magnetometers deployed on unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) to scan wider areas more rapidly and safely.10 This reduces
both financial costs in terms of information-gathering and risks
to personnel and equipment related to accidental detonation during on-site detection.11 Although this is a useful preliminary tool
for reducing the geographical expanse and cost of ground-based
surveys employed in HMA, UAVs are generally limited by weather
and environmental conditions,12 though novel approaches such as
using multi-sensor configurations attempt to overcome this.13 UAV
surveying also requires analyzing large, complex datasets, relying
heavily upon advances in machine learning (ML) to help interpret the data.14 Background noise in the data is another obstacle.15
Recent work using ML to detect and classify ordnance shows promise,16 but it is still in early phases of testing and implementation.

Given these challenges, many HMA organizations have shifted
efforts toward desk-based, data-driven approaches such as NTS.17
Such approaches offer preliminary assessments to detect areas of
interest to prioritize technical on-the-ground surveying.18 The
inherent difficulty in UXO detection and clearance in active conflict zones19 can be augmented using these methods, given the risk
of surveying areas that are traditionally considered too dangerous
for intervention (i.e., along the frontlines).20 Recent efforts demonstrate the value of using open-source investigation (OSINV) for
such preassessments. An innovative approach developed by The
Carter Center in 2019 optimizes existing open-source data on conflict events in Syria (ACLED and The Carter Center data collections)
to produce heat maps for high levels of explosive weapons use and
therefore potential UXO contamination.21 The HALO Trust, one
of the world’s preeminent demining organizations, recently joined
forces with Esri (the organization that develops ArcGIS) to map in
real time the presence of UXO and damage to residential areas or
infrastructure as the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfolds.22 This
includes efforts to automate mapping processes, where experts can
filter through a stream of evidence instead of manually searching
the internet for news articles and social media.23 Although this
offers the potential to document UXO presence in current and
future conflicts, munitions exist from as far back as World War I.24
The utility of The Carter Center’s approach is evident in the potential to make use of decades of existing data, 25 in combination with
current OSINV methods to address ERW.
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Methodology and Models
Carter Center Decoupled Events

ACLED Input Event
”On 21 May 2019…armed clashes…”

Event type

Munitions Type

Aerial Bombardment

Air Launched

Shelling

Ground Launched

Clashes

Excluded

Explosive contaminants are a large set of deadly munitions or
devices that include landmines and improvised explosives devices
(IEDs) as well as ERW. ERW as a classification includes both UXO
and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO); the former fail to detonate as intended and the latter are left behind or forgotten about.
Two core databases of conflict events inform this study. The first
is ACLED, which has coverage dating back to early 2017 for the
whole of Syria. The second is a unique dataset collected by The
Carter Center dating to 2012. Both datasets use a similar sourcing
methodology based on open-source collection and multi-user verification. Key sources for both sets include the Syrian Observatory
for Human Rights (SOHR)—a research network of on-the-ground
journalists and activists led by Rami Abdulrahman, 26 conflict
event information posted by trusted accounts on Twitter, local
newspapers, and video content shared on YouTube or Telegram,
with The Carter Center more often leveraging the latter. These conflict events in both datasets are classified by location, date, event
type, and a qualitative description of the event in plain writing.
The first and primary model we present is the OSWE model. To
create this model, raw data from ACLED and The Carter Center are
amended to be more optimally useful for desk study of UXO concentration.27 ACLED combines multiple explosive events (including multiple event types) in one location on one day into a single
event, labeled as only the event type considered to be the most
extreme. For example, an event that had artillery shelling, aerial
bombardment, and armed clashes would be treated as one event
marked as aerial bombardment. The additional event types are
then described in the qualitative description column. See Figure 1
for a visual explaining this decoupling.
The parsing of events helps to more accurately detect potential
areas and density of UXO contamination. In partnership with
Microsoft, we deploy a natural language processing technique based
on the BERT model28 to efficiently and broadly separate ACLEDreported events into constituent conflict events.29 We then begin by
filtering data from both ACLED and The Carter Center for conflict
events that deploy explosive munitions, namely aerial bombardment, shelling, IEDs, landmines, and reports of other UXO.
After selecting these event types, the question of how to weigh
different event types persists. A key benefit of The Carter Center’s
2012–2017 data is that it contains occasional mention of munition
count estimates from on-the-ground reports30 or in some cases,
explicit counting of munitions from video footage used as sourcing material.31 After cleaning the data further to specify munition
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Figure 1. Visual description of
The Carter Center’s process for
decoupling data from ACLED.

All graphics courtesy of the authors.
Sample Set
Event Count

Sample Set
Average (Estimate)

6,718

7.78 (8)

6,250

9.96 (10)

Landmines/UXO/IED

5,549

1.10 (1)

Miscellaneous Other

214

4.05 (4)

Munitions Category
Air-Launched
Munitions
Ground-Launched
Munitions

Table 1. Open-Source Weighted Estimate Model Sample
Set Detail.
counts across the data in which numbers are included, we then
use each munition category (air-launched, ground-launched, IED/
UXO/landmine, and miscellaneous other ) to create an estimate for
each. The number of events that inform each of these estimates, as
well as the mean of each sample used for each category are included
in Table 1.
Next, for comparison, we create two other models derived from
the same underlying dataset at the same scale. The first of these
models is the conflict intensity model, traditionally the default
approach for United Nations agencies and others alike. 33 This
model takes underlying conflict event data of all types (inclusive
of clashes, sniper fire, etc.), and uses these unweighted values to
assess the intensity of fighting over the course of a war in a geospatially specific manner. The final model, the UXO detonation
model, pulls from conflict event data of recorded UXO detonation, excluding all other events. This is done through qualitative
filtering of events based on the notes/description column of the
data, selecting for events explicitly mentioning unexploded munitions, munitions exploding from previous fighting, and explosives
of unknown origin.
We then run all three models at localized point-of-interest areas
in Syria, which are based on an intentionally and conflict-relevant
amended version of the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UNOCHA) geolocated populated places
data.34 The amendments are minor but incorporate several key
areas such as critical infrastructure or military locations in addition to the civilian points of the UNOCHA dataset. We then geoprocessed latitude and longitude coordinates for territorial control
points using ArcGIS’s Thiessen projection’s function, 35 thereby creating polygons around each unique spatial point to estimate each
location’s geographic area.36 Using a 1:1 spatial join, the results

from each of the three distinct models are added to the Thiessen
shapefile, providing a sum of munitions estimates for the OSWE
model and a count of events for the other models.
The results for each of the three UXO data results for potential
areas of contamination are normalized by the estimated polygon

shape area for each location and then selected for high and low concentration estimates. These estimates are then assessed for comparative analysis of differences between the three models at a local
(i.e., populated places) scale. Findings based on these comparisons
are presented and discussed next.

Data Findings

Figure 2. Nationwide heatmaps of the OSWE model (left), conflict intensity model (center), and UXO detonation
model (right).
Utilizing the OSWE model permits interpolating estimates for
missing data of munitions counts, thus enabling us to extrapolate
closer estimates of likely explosives munitions use across Syria. 37
Notably, this nets an estimate of well over one million explosive
munitions deployed in Syria by mid-2021. At a ten percent munitions detonation failure rate, 38 over 100,000 munitions need clearance nationwide, though this number is likely much higher.
Each model results in different spatial distribution of likely UXO
concentration; they are compared in Figure 2, indicating OSWE,
conflict intensity, and UXO detonation models from left to right.
The OSWE model (left) has much higher concentration in western Syria. The conflict intensity model (center) has a bit more of a
dispersed geospatial concentration. Finally, the UXO detonation
model (right) is heavily skewed toward southern Syria. Viewing
these models at a national scale is not as meaningful as getting into
a location-based specificity, so the authors developed an analytical
framework based on high levels of local concentration of explosive
munitions use, conflict events, and UXO detonations, respectively.
Using these three models to assess local contamination, we
then select for what we refer to as high-UXO-density locations
(HUDLs)—locations that score one standard deviation above
the model’s mean point value. These communities are those in
which each model presents a location of imperative UXO cleaning operations.
The three models identified different numbers of HUDLs based
on levels of variance inherent within the models. The OSWE
method pinpointed the broadest number of HUDLs (126), given
the disproportionate level of explosives munitions use within a
broad swath of key locations. Many of these locations endured
long-term active frontlines or were under heavy siege for many

months. The UXO detonation model determined the lowest number of HUDLs (eighteen), in large part due to the comparatively
low level of data inputs.
While these three models bear some overlap in HUDL selection (see Figure 3), the findings suggest that each approach has a
distinct usefulness or aim, with substantial overlap between the
OSWE method and a contemporary conflict intensity method.
All three models are derived from data with significant correlation (and indeed perhaps some codeterminance if not compared
and analyzed more intimately). The breakdown of locations identified by these models is shown in Table 2 (next page).
Notably, Model A (OSWE) and B (conflict intensity) had the
most overlap with each other, sharing the majority of their identified HUDLs. The conflict intensity model has the most unique locations identified, a factor that we attribute to the broadness of this
model’s approach as we describe earlier in this paper.
Figure 3. Visualization
of shared HUDL
identification by all
three models. Nodes
are for locations
and edges are for
selection in the
associated
model.
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Shared with Model A
(percentage)

Shared with Model B
(percentage)

Shared with Model C
(percentage)

Unique Locations
Idenfied (percentage)

-

112 (75%)

11 (61%)

14 (11%)

Model B - Conflict Intensity

112 (89%)

-

15 (83%)

34 (23%)

Model D - UXO Detonation

11 (9%)

15 (10%)

-

3 (17%)

Model
Model A - OSWE

Table 2. UXO estimate model HUDL overlap.

Analysis and Implications
We conclude that the OSWE method has more optimal, precise,
and expansive coverage of potential UXO contamination for current, future, and past conflicts. This is in large part due to the leverage of weighted big data approaches that underlie the desk study
method. This gives our approach considerable leverage for assessing needs and directing resources in any high-level armed conflict
where explosive munitions are and have been used at scale.
It is also crucial to note that this is only the tip of the OSWE
iceberg, as other sources for estimate weights can be applied
across contexts. In the model deployed for this desk survey, we
base estimates around munitions category (air-launched, groundlaunched, etc.), whereas munitions type (mortar, rocket artillery,
barrel bomb, airplane-launched, etc.) will provide a more granulate weighted estimate. Other methods of interpolation, such as
frontline density, era of conflict, or initiating actor could allow for
a compounding weighted estimate that may provide a more rigorous insight in future models.
UXO contamination is an issue that crosses frontlines and political divides, affecting large portions of Syria. Of the communities
at high risk identified through the OSWE method, Table 3 identifies the breakdown of which actors control the most likely HUDLs
in Syria.

Perhaps unsurprising to those watching Syria closely, the government of Syria controls the lion’s share of HUDLs in all models, in no small part due to its control over most of the territory of
Syria. However, this still accounts for a disproportionate share of
explosives munitions use, given that the government holds territorial claim over about fifty-five percent of all point locations tracked
by The Carter Center and about sixty-four percent of the total territory. Part of this high concentration of likely UXO contamination
in government-held territory has to do with the protracted conflict
and heavy besiegement of many territories retaken by the government, especially between 2017 and 2018.
Another crucial component of the OSWE method is that in addition to providing a count and percentage of HUDLs held by each
territory-holding actor in Syria, it allows for an estimated count of
munitions within each actor’s held territory. Table 4 identifies this
breakdown by each of the three major actors.
Using the results from the OSWE model helps assess contamination for areas controlled by different actors in Syria, allowing
HMA organizations with access to only one actor to assess needs
across their accessible territory. Table 3 indicates that the government of Syria controls many HUDLs through all three model
approaches; the OSWE can give useful insights about the density

Count of HUDLs
Government-Held
(percentage)

Count of HUDLs
Opposition-Held
(percentage)

Cound of HUDLs SDFHeld (percentage)

Count of HUDLs Joint
Government & SDF-Held
(percentage)

Model A - OSWE

117 (92%)

6 (5%)

2 (2%)

1 (1%)

Model B - Conflict Intensity

129 (86%)

9 (6%)

6 (4%)

4 (4%)

Model D - UXO Detonation

10 (56%)

5 (28%)

0 (0%)

3 (16%)

Model

Table 3. HUDL count by faction control.
Count of HUDLs
(percentage)

Total Territory Held in
SQKM (percentage)

Estimated Count of
UXO (percentage)

UXO Density in UXO
per SQKM

Government-Held

117 (92%)

118,869 (64%)

757,689 (79%)

6.4

Opposition-Held

6 (5%)

11,174 (6%)

145,369 (15%)

13.0

SDF-Held

2 (2%)

46,087 (25%)

33,146 (3%)

0.7

1 (<1%)

2,939 (2%)

24,643 (3%)

8.4

0 (0%)

6,759 (3%)

14 (<1%)

0.0

Joint Government & SDF-Held
US-Held

Table 4. OSWE model detection of UXO by faction.
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Model

Count of HUDLs (percentage)

Primary HUDL Holder, by Count Primary Governorate, by Count
(percentage)
(percentage)

Model A - OSWE

100 (79%)

Government, 117 (93%)

Aleppo, 57 (45%)

Model B - Conflict Intensity

92 (61%)

Government, 129 (86%)

Aleppo, 70 (47%)

Model D - UXO Detonation

18 (100%)

Government, 10 (56%)

Aleppo, 5 (28%)

Table 5. Model comparison, filtered by location 2+ degrees from a frontline.
of explosive weapons use and likely UXO contamination that follows. Using this approach, we find that the territory holder with
the highest likely UXO density is the armed opposition, who have
almost twice the likely level of contamination as the government
of Syria on the aggregate. Notably, the opposition only controls
about six percent of all territory by area and about sixteen percent
of all settled locations.
One final example assessing HUDLs and areas of control by
the major factions in Syria’s war has to do with the frontlines
in Syria. A major hurdle identified both in the literature and in
conversations we had with HMA personnel pertains to the aforementioned security risks associated with frontlines. Filtering
these three models for locations that are at least fifteen km from
a frontline allows for selection of both high-density areas for
clearance and those that are more accessible to technical survey and clearance teams. This can be accomplished by using
The Carter Center’s previously discussed geolocated dataset on
territorial control in Syria. The previously described Thiessen
polygons are created by estimated midpoints between neighboring locations. Dissolving these point-centered polygons based

on an aggregated feature, in this case “armed group in control,”
allows for creating larger polygons that denote areas of control
for each month in the conf lict, resulting in a highly accurate and
dynamic estimate of frontline locations. Using the proximity
function, the distance from each location point to the boundary
of neighboring polygons controlled by opposing armed factions
allows for estimating distance from the frontline, or more than
one in cases where multiple fronts are colliding. In turn, it is
possible to assess how geographically concentrated locations are
within conf lict zones.
See Table 5 for information about how each of these three models
interacts with this filter for HUDLs at least fifteen km away from a
frontline.39 As of June 2022, 5,127 locations (points of control) are
at least fifteen km from a frontline (or sixty-three percent of Syria).
Combining such analysis with the OSWE method illustrates
how impactful such a method could be for those directing the difficult work of technical surveys and eventual UXO and mine clearance projects while safeguarding the safety of their staff.

Conclusion
It is crucial to note that this methodology is still in development.
This paper builds upon a few years of data collection and analysis, but The Carter Center is continuing to hone this methodology.
We aim to ensure that the method is easily replicable in other contexts, and indeed a similar approach is now being used by others in
the field today. As noted, HALO is partnering with Esri to utilize
open-source data to anticipate UXO clearance needs in Ukraine as
the war there unfolds. Development of this theoretical desk study
method, as with any method for determining likely UXO density
and clearance need, is directly connected to saving the lives of
civilians who have already endured a brutal conflict.

The Carter Center is expressly interested in working with HMA
organizations to continue developing methods to improve and
make the explosives clearance process more feasible and efficient.
Relatedly, this method could be tested in the future against UXO
clearance data—checking the newer OSWE method against legacy
desk study approaches. With access to that responding data, analysts will be able to run tests measuring direct applicability of this
method to continue to assess biases in the data and its methods.
See endnotes page 111
The views expressed in this article do not represent the authors’
current or previous employers.
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THE TIME
HAS COME
FOR DIGITAL
EXPLOSIVE
ORDNANCE RISK
EDUCATION
By Robin Toal [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]

Simple graphics from the pilot project in Ninewa, Iraq.
All images courtesy of the author/MAG.

T

he increase in the number of civilian casualties from landmines and other explosive ordnance
(EO) in recent years has driven the demand for new and innovative ways to provide communities
with risk education. Additionally, with access limited by the COVID-19 pandemic, humanitarian
organizations like MAG (Mines Adivsory Group) have had to adapt their approach, focusing on digital
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) to reach individuals and communities affected by EO.
MAG’s digital risk education project uses targeted social media
ads to encourage safe behavior and teach communities how to
identify and report EO to local authorities. The latest data on EO
accident trends via the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) or national databases, plus real-time user engagement data via digital platforms, are used to inform agile strategies
that can respond to changes and developments on the ground,
ensuring messages reach high-risk regions and demographics.
Since 2019, MAG has piloted online risk education to encourage
safe behaviors. In Ninewa, Iraq, the pilot—the first phase of the
project—was the first time that risk education messaging was delivered on a large scale using Facebook ads. The results were promising, with ads shown twenty-nine million times to 983,447 people in
Ninewa Governorate. Community liaison surveys showed that 94
percent of people surveyed in the community confirmed they saw
the ads on Facebook and that the ads helped them understand the
risks posed by EO.

Following the successful pilot in Iraq, MAG formed a partnership with the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the
US Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/
WRA) and Facebook to launch the second phase of the project.
While the pilot project focused solely on areas of northern Iraq
liberated from ISIS, phase two reached more than eleven million
at-risk civilians in Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and Vietnam in 2021.
The partnership expanded in 2022 to include Palestine (via the
United Nations Mine Action Service) and Syria, while digital risk
education was also delivered in Ukraine. These countries remain
heavily contaminated by landmines, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other EO that kill and
maim civilians while also blocking economic development and the
return of displaced communities.

MAG’s senior community liaison advisor Sebastian Kasack notes that “new approaches are
crucial to try to reach as many people as we can, especially in challenging environments.
Using social media, for example, provides the opportunity to reach high numbers of people,
including younger audiences, which can be difficult to reach through 'traditional' means.”
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Abdulsalam Muhammed of Northeast Ninewa sharing risk education messages on
Facebook with his grandchildren.

Digital EORE
As digital EORE is a realitively new initiative, there is little
data available on the efficacy and efficiency of using social media
to impact change. MAG’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
approach aims to provide context to the development and distribution of digital risk education materials, identify and provide
recommendations to address barriers to access, measure communities’ knowledge of safe behaviors (pre-campaign), and determine
the extent to which changes are seen by measuring understanding of safe behaviors (post-campaign). MAG gathered feedback
on these activities through focus group discussions and a quantitative survey among community members before and after the
project. Our team also circulated digital surveys with users who
were shown ads online to capture comprehensive insights on the
effectiveness of the initiative.
Social media is a competitive and congested environment
where it is easy to scroll away from content that is not of interest or relevant to the user. Particularly in highly developed social
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media markets like Vietnam and Lebanon, content must be
competitive among other ads. To maximize effectiveness in an
advertising-based social media space, digital risk education must
present the issues realistically, engage users within the first few
seconds, and deliver key messages promptly. By breaking up longer videos into shorter individual key messages, risk education
practitioners can significantly increase the consumption of EORE
materials, enhance awareness of the threat, deliver practical steps
on how to stay safe, and provide guidance on how to report EO to
relevant authorities. Alternatively, EORE image ads are effective at
engaging with communities who have limited or expensive internet data and thus may be more suitable for communities living in
remote and rural areas.
In all country contexts, EORE video ads produced by the NGO
Clowns Without Borders1 and videos of higher production value
performed better. Animated ads worked best with young people,
while live action videos were popular in all contexts where they

were published. In most countries, users appeared to clearly
understand the message of the ads, and 68 percent of beneficiaries
surveyed recalled recently seeing one of the ads published by the
project. Of respondents who recalled seeing an ad, 98 percent said
that they had read the ad and/or clicked on the link, and 91 percent
reported learning something from the ad. Beneficiaries’ level of
confidence to report dangerous items to MAG or the national mine
action authority rose after viewing the ads.
Gender and Local Environment. Additionally, to deliver
effective digital EORE, it is recommended to invest in high-quality
content that effectively engages users of both genders. MAG advocates for the integrated and systematic use of gender analysis at all
stages of the project cycle. Digital risk education is designed with
gender-sensitivity, inclusion, and participation as a core principle.
Data from the first year of MAG’s digital risk education project
revealed that girls and women tend to engage more with human
faces and stories. As a result, and in order to boost interaction,
MAG developed people-centric and beneficiary-based risk education content that reflects situations, landscapes, and people from
their communities.
Traditional in-person risk education approaches can be limited
or restricted entirely due to environmental and logistical barriers. Security considerations can prevent community liaison teams
from accessing areas to deliver risk education, leaving EO-affected
communities without support when they need it most. Weather,
such as during monsoon seasons, can also restrict access and may
become a greater problem as climate change triggers more extreme
weather events.
Local community guidance and buy-in is needed to inform relevant and responsible choices about project and material design.
In some contexts, community liaison staff that closely identify
with the communities they serve enjoy increased access and higher
engagement; however, digital approaches can reach communities
regardless of liaison staff.

An 8th grade student at
Hai Lam Primary and
Secondary School,
views risk education
materials on her
mobile phone.

Benefits of Digital EORE. To engage groups unable to attend
or for which in-person sessions are inaccessible, digital EORE content can reach platforms where they are already active. Digital EORE
can also provide a lower-cost method of engaging target communities as it requires fewer human resources and has lower logistical
costs. Social media advertising in particular can be a cost-effective
method of engaging both large and niche communities.
Changes in technology have also served to better enable risk
education practitioners to take control of the content development
and distribution processes that increases speed and reduces costs.
Graphic design, including video development, is now accessible to
more people using simple and affordable software while tools to
create and deliver messages and ads on social media is intuitive
and easy to learn.
Developing a digital component to established EORE activities
increases opportunities to engage with mine-affected communities. Additionally, digital content is more universally accessible
to people with limited mobility as it can deliver messages to their
home via their personal devices. Our materials tend to include subtitles and spoken word audio to enable people with sight or hearing
impairments to engage with the materials. This approach complements in-person activities by providing accessible, lifesaving information and prioritizing key messages with traditional sessions.
Digital EORE works best when there is human capacity and knowledge to integrate and complement existing activities and bridge the
gap between the online and offline worlds.

A short risk education video developed by Clowns
Without Borders in the Maxa language for Somalia
delivered using Facebook ads.
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In Bata, Equatorial Guinea, MAG used digital technology to deliver emergency risk education.
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Case Study: Equatorial Guinea
While digital EORE works best when supported by an active
clearance capacity to remove the threat, it can also function as a
stand-alone activity, and in some circumstances, may be the only
way to engage with mine-affected communities. In March 2021,
Bata, the largest city in Equatorial Guinea, was rocked by an explosion that killed 107 people and injured another 600. The explosion
scattered EO across the city and up to 7 km from the blast site,
causing significant damage to infrastructure.
The population of Bata were unfamiliar with the threat of EO
and engaged in risk-taking activities such as taking selfies with

items of scattered ordnance. Assessment teams observed civilians
collecting and selling scrap metal and children playing in dangerous areas. The situation required an urgent response.
In coordination with UNICEF, the UN, and UNESCO, MAG
rapidly developed Spanish language digital EORE materials and
distributed them via Facebook ads to all users within 40 km of the
blast site. Within six days of the explosion, digital EORE materials
reached more than 18,000 individuals online, providing them with
potentially lifesaving information.

“This new approach of delivering lifesaving lessons via Facebook ads in response to
emergency scenarios ensures that we reach people affected by EO when they need it most,
helping to reduce the risk of harm and keeping families safe. Digital channels enable us to
get urgent warnings to affected communities when physical access is challenging.”
~ Sebastian Kasack, MAG Senior Community Liaison Advisor

Case Study: Sy Vietnam
Truong Van Sy, a twenty-three year-old computer technician,
lives in Hoành Viễn village, Quàng Binh Province, with his parents, brother, his wife, and their daughter. Sy’s neighbor, at only
thirty-five years-old, was a victim of an EO accident, killed in 2011
after stepping on a cluster bomblet.
Sy saw MAG’s EORE messages on his mobile phone in August
and September 2021 and through these ads, found the EO reporting hotline number for Quảng Bình Province. He called the hotline
number to report a BLU-26 submunition, which he discovered on
the edge of his fish farm during cultivation some time ago but had
not known how or who to call for help.

Coordination Unit and sent a community liaison team there to collect information the next day. MAG’s Multi-Task Team destroyed
the bomb in situ on 30 September.
Sy said after the bomb was destroyed, “We feel safe now to work
on the land.”

Sy and a MAG community liaison officer
view the Facebook post that gave Sy the
information on how to report the explosive
ordnance he found on his land.

A year ago, I encountered a cluster bomblet while working
in my family farm. At that time, I was very scared and nervous
and didn’t know what to do. I left the area with the bomb
untouched. Recently, many local people went into my land for
picking mushrooms (and shooting birds) so I was really afraid
that they might unfortunately step on the bomb that could
endanger them. I always told everyone about the location of
the bomb so people knew to avoid it.

Sy and his family are all regular Facebook users. Sy has liked and
followed MAG Vietnam’s Facebook page for updates.
I feel lucky to be able to know about MAG’s work and the
EO reporting hotline number via MAG’s Facebook page so
I can report the item. I hope that there will be more meaningful ads like these in the future so everyone knows how to
call for help when an EO is found and knows how to avoid
EO-related accidents as well.

Sy reported the cluster bomblet on 27 September 2021.
MAG received the request from QB Mine Action Database and
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What’s Next?
“The digital EORE project is an exciting project taking advantage of the opportunities new
technologies offer. Our lifesaving messages delivered through social media networks can
reach men, women, and teenagers living in remote areas and still living on land contaminated with explosive remnants of war. The project allows us to tremendously increase our
reach and increase the impact of our lifesaving work.”
~ Hélène Kuperman, Former MAG Country Director for Vietnam
MAG has established and integrated digital EORE into a number
of programs, country strategies, and proposals to provide a sustainable platform for further development. In 2023, MAG will continue
to develop digital EORE, including in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine,
Syria, Vietnam, and Ukraine, as well as developing digital provision to support small arms and light weapons (SALW) risk education. Similar to MAG’s approach with EORE, the purpose of SALW
risk education will be to raise awareness of the threat of SALW and
provide practical advice on how to reduce risks. Examples of practical SALW advice may include communicating the risks of firing
your weapon into the air and safety reasons for securing weapons.
Emerging in the sector before the COVID-19 pandemic began
in 2020, digital approaches became more important than ever
as teams around the world were severely limited in performing in-person EORE. The Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining’s (GICHD) Review of New Technologies
and Methodologies for EORE in Challenging Contexts captured the
growing number of activities across the humanitarian mine action
(HMA) sector, which led to the creation of the Digital Task Team as
an official offshoot of the EORE Advisory Group.2 Representatives
from HMA organizations around the world regularly meet to
develop strategies and best practices, and to formalize the initiative through a consistent monitoring and evaulation framework.

In May 2022, the first ever digital EORE workshop was hosted
by UNICEF and GICHD in Switzerland. The workshop gathered
around twenty EORE practitioners from across regions and organizations to take stock of tools, trends, successes, and gaps in
digital programming both in EORE and other humanitarian aid
sectors in order to strategically promote effective and ethical digital EORE in mine action. Participants drafted an action plan with
short-, medium-, and long-term actions—many of which could fall
under the scope of the Digital Task Team either through its existing subgroups or through the setup of new subgroups. Many HMA
organizations are now active in delivering some form of digital
EORE in countries on every continent.
Social media provides a new way to engage with communities in
a dynamic and cost-effective manner. It enables us to reach large
numbers of people in a specific area, overcoming obstacles posed
by security, geography, and complex operating environments that
limit the delivery of face-to-face risk education. The ability to
target people based on specific criteria will ensure that we reach
the most at-risk communities as well as groups that are harder to
attract through “traditional” face-to-face sessions such as youth
and young adults who are often the most difficult to reach.
See endnotes page 112
MAG’s digital EORE work is generously supported by the US
Department of State and Facebook.
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THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY
AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT:
A Successful Implementing Partnership Perspective

By Lee Moroney [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
and Mark Veneris [ US European Command HMA Program ]

T

o avoid unplanned explosion of munitions (UEM) and to lower the risk of illicit diversion, the
humanitarian requirements ensuring strong ammunition management structures, systems, and
processes by states have been well documented in past issues of this Journal and other publications. These needs have led to the evolution of multilateral and bilateral support from donor nations
that see the humanitarian value of supporting physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).
Over the past two decades, the Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement in the US State Department's Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs (PM/WRA) and the US Department of Defense
(DoD) have shown significant support for PSSM through the geographic combatant command (COCOM) programs. This article
analyzes how methods have changed from just planting the flag
with “first-aid fixes” to a holistic, capacity-building approach.
Even though early engagements in PSSM operations proved
that something is better than nothing, these actions had limited
impact. These varied from assessment missions with recommendations but “no teeth” to short-term training with no continuation
training or mentorship programs, while others involved building
storehouses without looking at procedural development support
or one-off disposal projects that ignored wider surveillance and
disposal planning. Presently, only one COCOM1 currently engages
in a comprehensive capacity development approach working to
develop national capability.

With Golden West implemented project management,
EUCOM provided financial support to renovate this
explosive storehouse (ESH).

All images courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.

Georgian Defence
Forces conduct
explosive limit license
exercises during
EUCOM-Golden West
mentorship.
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Georgian Defence
Force graduates of
the EUCOM PSSM
foundation course.

The US Approach
The US European Command (EUCOM) is the US DoD’s
COCOM that has embraced this deliberate approach to its theater
security cooperation (TSC) programs and has been leading the
way with ongoing successful projects in Moldova, Georgia, and
Albania since 2018, with more countries to be supported in the
future. Since 2018, the EUCOM PSSM program has provided over
US$10,000,000 to support PSSM activities within its three main
focus areas: infrastructure support, equipment support, and training and mentorship support.
First steps. Like any successful TSC program, the core element to success begins with the host nation officially requesting
support rather than having support forced on them. This is the
first challenge, as it can be suggested that decision makers
generally don’t know what they don’t know. An approach
implemented by Golden West Humanitarian Foundation
(GWHF) in 2018, with donor support from PM/WRA,
brought together senior officers directly involved in PSSM
in their host countries to share their experiences in conversations chaired and guided by qualified practitioners. Also
invited as participants were the EUCOM HMA program
manager and subject-matter experts (SMEs).
Having the right people involved from the start and
enabling open dialogue rather than a one-way training
approach enabled various structural and capability gaps
to be identified so a baseline needs assessment could be
produced. This process ultimately led to support projects
starting in three countries within twelve months of these
meetings.
Maintaining momentum. Following the initial meetings, participants briefed their chain of command, and
follow-up meetings with high-level leaders and decisionmakers occured to maintain momentum and guarantee support for the host nation. Due to multiple layers of
Mentored by Golden West, Moldovan Armed
Forces conduct quantity distance on-the-job
training.
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bureaucracy to work through in recipient countries, momentum
is critical for multi-year PSSM activities that also depend on the
movement of other inter-dependent activities. By maintaining
momentum, projects can move forward successfully and in unison
with other relevant PSSM work. This level of host nation support
was possible through the combined efforts of the EUCOM team
(and combined US military) as well as the implementing international nongovernmental organizations’ (INGO) SMEs. We believe
this contributed to the overall success of the programs since previously lead PSSM initiatives had held numerous assessments with
limited authorities involved or budgets to work with, and failed to
conduct follow-up assessments.

EUCOM provided
infrastructure and equipment
for this ammunition depot in
Moldova. The program does
not just focus on explosive
storehouses but all facilities
that support best practices in
ammunition management for
safety and security.

Evolution of PSSM
One of the major evolutions over the past few years has been an
increase in communication and collaboration between countries,
donor governments, and international organizations. Beginning
with the introduction of the International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011, the community now coordinates and
works together well, while the establishment of the Ammunition
Management Advisory Team (AMAT) at the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is a good example of
how to bring international organizations together. Together with
organizations like the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs (UNODA) and donors such as the United States, practitioners and implementing partners similar to GWHF and other

INGOs coordinate with and support countries who request PSSM
assistance. This multi-faceted working group in both official and
unofficial forms has engaged collaboratively throughout the development of Version 3 of the IATG. On behalf of EUCOM, GWHF
ensures that the execution of the new Version is implemented at
all levels—where support includes manageing infrastructure, procuring equipment, developing training, and providing SMEs and
(embedded) mentorship for host nations.
An additional evolution for PSSM was the modification of
United States Code Title 10 Section 407 in 2017 that placed the
authority to conduct PSSM activities squarely in the DOD HMA
TSC program.

Measuring Success
Success in PSSM can only be measured by lasting impact. As the
HMA community has learned through its demining efforts, ensuring a sustainable impact is immensely challenging. Compared to
demining, measuring PSSM success is even more difficult. Success
in demining can be determined by numbers, such as square meters
cleared, land released through survey, unexploded ordnance (UXO)
destroyed, abandoned explosive ordnance destroyed, countries
declared mine-free, etc. Less obvious are the metrics for PSSM,
which must be viewed through a different lens than mine action.
The EUCOM program views this success as supporting the development of a national capacity where countries have national regulations, procedures, political structures (within the responsible

ministries), tradesmanship, infrastructure, training, equipment,
supplies, and national budget allocations in place for PSSM programs. Through GWHF, EUCOM contracts experienced qualified
retired military personnel with HMA experience to work directly
with the host nation. They also engage closely with the US Office
of Defense Cooperation (ODC), who are generally working with
other elements of support to MOD structures in all of these levels
in a top-down and bottom-up approach.
The EUCOM program understands trust takes time to build
and works through partnerships with the host nation, ODCs, and
implementing partners such as GWHF, to develop a quantifiable
plan of action directed towards eventual fade out.

Over the past two decades, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US State Department's
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and The US Department of Defense (DoD) have shown
significant support for PSSM through the geographic combatant command (COCOM) programs.
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Utilizing the results of EUCOM infrastructure upgrades,
with equipment provided to the Albanian Armed Forces.

Tailoring the Approach
As detailed at the start of this article, the level of long-term partnerships and multi-year assistance provided to countries are measures of success. Similarly, the updated UNSaferguard Quantity
Distance maps of depots represent an achievement of the program
that would reduce the risk and impact of a potential UEM. While
countries will rarely have exactly the same needs at the same levels of support, supporting synergies such as standardized training curriculums, training trackers, and national regulators are
required for most (but not all) countries. Qualified SMEs that can
advise, mentor, support training, manage programs in refurbishment/construction projects of old storage areas to IATG-compliant
standards, and procure equipment throughout the plan of action
are investments that donors employ to build a sustainable ammunition management program.
EUCOM continues to refurbish ammunition depots and compounds, and provides equipment ranging from the basic materials such as pallets and banding equipment to mechanical handling
equipment (MHE). The program is concurrently developing and
executing a comprehensive phased train-the-trainer program from
basic ammunition management through to an upper management

Lee Moroney
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Ammunition Management. He has managed
humanitarian mine action programmes in South
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Albanian personnel inspect, audit, palletize,
and store ammunition in accordance with
international best practices .
level based on the IATGs. By creating various levels of regulatory
and procedural review for each country, EUCOM identifies relevant, implementable, and sustainable focus areas for the partner
country through the US military and GWHF SMEs.
While the EUCOM example may not be appropriate for every
country, geopolitics and funding may dictate that support to one
country requires multiple-lateral engagement. However, even with
the best of intentions, this approach can be more difficult. Aspects
of financial and operational support may need to synchronize,
stretching the capacity of an already over-extended host nation.
As PSSM challenges arise, EUCOM will proudly continue to
support countries that have requested assistance. Accepting these
challenges, GWHF, as a US-founded and US-based INGO, will
continue to leverage the technical expertise and project management it has provided the US Government. However, the partner
nations deserve recognition for taking the first step, choosing to
open up their structures, facilities, and regulations to strengthening their capacity and capabilities for a safer and more secure
ammunition management structure.
See endnotes page 112
Mark Veneris
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US European Command (EUCOM)
Mark Veneris serves as the Headquarters
US
European
Command
(EUCOM)
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) program. Mark has managed the EUCOM HMA
program since 2012, overseeing engagement
activities in over twelve countries in the EUCOM area of
responsibility in every pillar of HMA. He has worked across
the DOD HMA community and private sector to increase
replicability and service component engagement as well as
a reduce cost.
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more coherently in order to more effectively meet peoples’ needs, mitigate vulnerabilities, and move towards
sustainable peace.M. Caparini & A. Reagan, “Connecting the Dots on the Triple Nexus,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2019, https://bit.
ly/3dX1rPx.
2. NES is located between the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, known in history also as Mesopothamia,
and is home to vast fertile areas.
3. See, for example, the Geneva International Center for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and United Nations Development Programe (UNDP)'s 2017 study: “Leaving No
One Behind: Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals.”
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this topic were also held at the 25th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations
Advisers.
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assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By 2012, the Trust
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Mapping Unexploded Ordnance in Syria: Harnessing the
Power of Open-Source Information by Stall, Hudson, Leendertse, Prasad,McNaboe, Shabb, and Robinson
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in very high levels of false positives, or not fine-tuned
enough and missing real UXOs (Beran 2013).; MacDonald
2004. Traditional metal detectors also cannot capture an
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This data cleaning was done in large part through a partnership with the Georgia Tech-based DataWorks, through
which our team and theirs manually cleaned conflict data
to prepare it for analysis.
[Devlin et al., 2018] Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang,
Kenton Lee, and Kristina Toutanova. BERT: Pre-training
of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding. arXiv e-prints, page arXiv:1810.04805, Oct 2018.
Trivedi, Anusua; Keator, Kate; Scholtens, Michael; Haigood, Brandon; Dodhia, Rahul; Lavista Ferres, Juan;
Sankar, Ria; and Verma, Avirishu. (2021). How to Handle
Armed Conflict Data in a Real-World Scenario? Philosophy & Technology. 34. 1-13. 10.1007/s13347-020-00424-5.
https://bit.ly/3In7tE6
For example, see “112 Russian Air Strikes in Syrian Desert;
about 20 ISIS mercenaries killed”, Hawar News Agency,
February 25, 2021, accessed June 16, 2022, https://bit.
ly/3yrrk0n.
Examples include from Twitter. See QalaatM, “Low Flying
Helicopters Are Perfect Targets for #ATGM”, Twitter, April
5, 2022, accessed June 16, 2022, https://bit.ly/3nO1Bu9.
QalaatM, “E. Syria: US Airstrikes vs Ammo depots & positions”, Twitter, January 5, 2022, accessed June 16, 2022,
https://bit.ly/3PhdLaO. YouTube also contains multiple
videos uploaded by the various belligerents in the Syrian conflict, see Thawir Al-Yasamin, “ىطسولا ةقرفلا
ةربانشلا ةنيدم ىلع يريصنلا يناريالا موجهلا دص
 نواهلا فئاذقب82”, YouTube, December 16, 2015, accessed June 16, 2022, https://bit.ly/3P0AvMw.
Note: “Miscellaneous other munitions” includes specifically only those cluster munitions that we have not yet
been able to confirm as from air-launched or groundlaunched deployment systems.
See, for example, Figure 1 on page 2 of the May 2022 report put out by the United Nations’ Syria Response Mine
Action Area of Responsibility, available at the following
link: https://bit.ly/3nTNNy4
https://bit.ly/3astC7t
Hayhoe, H. N., and G. D. V. Williams. “Computing and
Mapping Thiessen Weighting Factors from Digitized
District Boundaries and Climatological Station Latitudes
and Longitudes.” Journal of Applied Meteorology (19621982) 21, no. 10 (1982): 1563–66. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/26180774.
There is not a dataset of agreed-upon location border are
not polygons for all locations at the local level, so the size/
geographic expanse of locations must be estimated. For
example, Syria LiveUAMap has more local level polygons
but village boundaries are not always available.
When using this method in real time, munition counts
can be tracked to better inform the weighted estimate
through both ACLED weekly outputs and open-source
investigation of combat footage.
Note: there is no universally accepted “failure rate” calculation agreed upon by HMAs and others. A 10-30%
failure rate is expected for cluster munitions, but the same
cannot be said for all other explosive munitions given the
complex matrix of variables that lead to munition failure
such as ground type, firing conditions, ammunition age,
and more. We instead advocate for using a munitions
counting approach, as it makes any possible failure rate
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applicable to a dataset. 10% is a conservative estimate
for a method that is assumed to still be a major undercount of full munitions count. The US military also uses an
11% failure rate as a standard for decommissioning firing
ranges, giving further credence to acceptance of a 10%
failure rate as a minimum. See, for example: Brannon et al.
2000, pg 5
15 km range is used based on the top-end range of an
early modern 155mm howitzer.

The Time Has Come for Digital Explosive Ordnance Risk
Education by Robin Toal [ from page 95 ]
1. MAG has worked with Clowns without Borders in Lebanon
and Myanmar prior to engaging in digital EORE. CWB was
founded in 1993 and exists in 15 countries. Its vision is: to
create a world where all people can experience laughter,
play, and feel hope, especially in humanitarian crises.
https://clownswithoutborders.org
2. “Review of New Technologies and Methodologies for
EORE in Challenging Contexts,” Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, EORE.org, accessed
13 September, 2022, https://www.eore.org/.
The Evolution of Physical Security and Stockpile
Management:A Successful Implementing Partnership Perspective by Moroney and Veneris [ from page 101 ]
1. Geographic combatant commands operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional
military focus
2. https://bit.ly/3y2PwqE
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and money well spent. When highlighting
recipients of our programs and operations,
are we doing so with the input, opinions,
knowledge, and experiences of those individuals and communities we’re aiding? Are we
cognizant of not using an individual’s disability, socioeconomic status, and/or trauma to
highlight our needs and successes?

For full descriptions, visit our website

Munitions Destruction:
Techniques and Equipment
When dealing with surplus or obsolete
stockpiles of ammunition or SALW, how can
countries efficiently dispose of munitions?
What techniques or equipment are programs
using to ensure these weapons are destroyed
at minimal cost while maximizing safety?
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Accessible Technology
for MA
How can the MA sector create
technology that is more accessible for
disabled persons and inclusive for the
general population? From cuttingedge to low-cost, what has already
been incorporated and what does the
future hold to make technology more
accessible for more people?

Improving PSSM
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Explosive Hazards Clearance &
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Legal Considerations for Remote
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Learned and the Way Forward

Quick Reaction Force
Gender and Age in CWD

Image courtesy of Humanity & Inclusion.

Machine Learning for OpenSource Intelligence in MA

Environmental Management and
Sustainable Development

Events in Ukraine demonstrate the value of
open source intelligence. With ubiquitous
access to social networks and mobile phones
with high-quality cameras, an overabundance
of images and videos need careful, technical
scrutiny. How is mine action using advances
in computer vision to make object detection
and identification integral tools for organizations looking to gather and analyze data from
public sources?

How are organizations mitigating the environmental impacts of operations on vegetation,
wildlife, soil, and air? How is MA positively
contributing to the protection of natural resources, to local socioeconomic development,
and to environments post clearance?

Interoperability in Mine Action
and PSSM
Frequently, humanitarian demining and CWD
programs rely on the capacity, expertise,
knowledge, and resources of multiple entities.
How are programs making connections,
building relationships, growing capacity, and
strengthening regional security?

Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG (Mines Advisory Group).

The Blurred Line of Humanitarian
Aid in Conflict Settings
Mine action is grounded in humanitarian principles and maintains strict policies of neutrality.
When organizations find themselves in areas
with immediate security concerns, does the
scope of their activities change? How do priorities shift to the protection of staff, and how
can organizations ensure the safety of their
personnel while mobilizing critical resources to
still pursue humanitarian objectives?
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